THE BEHAVIORAL HEALTH ASSESSMENT RESPONSE PROJECT
(B-HARP)

INNOVATION PROJECT: FINAL REPORT (DRAFT)
FOR THE MHSA OAC
JULY 2023 REPORT

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Tables and Figures

SECTION 1:

ORIGINAL INNovation PROPOSAL

PROJECT GOALS

AND

MHSA EXPECTATIONS

B-HARP Innovation Project Original MHSA Proposal

The original proposal submitted to MHSOAC on May 19, 2019 indicated that one of the Primary Purposes of the project was to show the promotion of *"interagency and community collaboration related to Mental Health Services or support of outcomes."* During that time project proposed to address the following Primary Problem:

"San Luis Obispo County lacks a coordinated and collaborative training model and system to assess and intervene as necessary with school-based threats. Although threat assessments and monitoring have become a staple practice in educational institutions, recent case study reviews have noted that isolated, inconsistent, and ineffective implementation of threat assessment and monitoring can leave educational institutions vulnerable to violent incidents (Goodrum et. al 2018, White 2017). With the increasing, ongoing threats and lack of a coordinated and collaborative model system, San Luis Obispo County is at a disadvantage to assess and engage youth in these situations.

Presently, none of the educational, law enforcement or educational institutions have a regular data base that monitors the number of threats made, whether low level or of higher level, type of threat, and by whom, that warrants a multi-agency response. San Luis Coastal Unified provided the following information based upon a review of threat assessment reports from the past several years. These cases are frequencies and presented in a range as each year may differ

High Level Threats	Requiring Multi-Agency Response	Requiring Mobile Crisis or Hospitalization	Amount of Staff Time Paperwork and Follow-up	Ongoing Monitoring
9-12 per year	2-4 per year	2-3 per year	2-3 weeks	2 months

It should also be noted that there have been several cases in the last 5 years that have required multi-agency involvement with one including FBI involvement involving a student and parent."

The 2019 Proposal indicated that, *"the project is designed to develop a coordinated and collaborative training model and system to learn, assess, and intervene when cases of threat become apparent or imminent. The innovation project is also designed to create a new learning and language model between the mental health system (MHS), law enforcement (LE), and educational institutions employing a new curriculum derived from proven and effective models, but tailored to San Luis Obispo and directed to the coordinating efforts between MHS, LE, educational institutions (EI). The innovation project is meant to educate and decrease the criminalization and stigmatization of youth in cases of threats."*

2019 INNovation Proposal Goals:
The Innovation Project's goals/aims are the following:

1. **Provide Stakeholder/Participant Training**-The County and its stakeholders hope to learn more about the best approaches for teaching and training of threat assessment procedures for MHPs, LE, and EI staff in a community with limited resources.

2. **Develop a Community Threat Assessment System**-The County and its stakeholders seek to understand the best components that make an efficient, coordinated, and collaborative system and model related to threat assessment.

3. **Community Education and Outreach on Warning Signs**-The County and its stakeholders seek to learn better methods to increase prevention and early detection and engagement as it relates to threat assessment.

This means public outreach, education, and empowerment. The goal is to define and prepare for early identification and assist as it is required in the community when threats are present.

4. **Increase Knowledge of Mental Health Intervention Approaches**-The County and its stakeholders seek to better understand how MHP should approach and treat individuals or students who have made threats or gestures towards homicidal violence.

Learning Goals/Project Aims-Questions and Answers

The broad objective of the Innovative Component of the MHSA is to incentivize learning that contributes to the expansion of effective practices in the mental health system. Describe your learning goals/specific aims and how you hope to contribute to the expansion of effective practices.

What is it that you want to learn or better understand over the course of the INN Project, and why have you prioritized these goals?

The Innovation Project's objectives/metric outcomes were the following**:**
Goal 1--Provide Stakeholder/Participant Training-
a) *Objective*-Increase the level of skill and knowledge for MHPs, LE, and EI staff to identify and prevent school and community threats as defined and assessed by a training model.

b) *Outcomes*-Metrics include number of pre/post retrospective surveys, testing objective knowledge via multiple choice questions, and roster of training participants. Training/consulting expert progress reports will be collected.

Goal 2-- Develop a Community Threat Assessment System-
a) *Objective*- Increase the level of interagency organization collaboration through the development and use of the coordinated and collaborative training system and model for threat assessment.

b) *Outcomes*- Metrics include documentation of interagency meetings, number of coordinated collaborative threat assessments conducted by B-HARP Teams *(formerly known in original proposal as SLOTAP)* This includes (e.g. source, type, level, recommendations), awareness of potential stereotypes via reflections and open-ended responses, and interagency B-HARP team knowledge, skill, communication assessment via expert case review, review of collaborative threat reports, and self-report.

Goal 3-- Community Education and Outreach on Warning Signs-
a) *Objective*- Decrease the number and level of potential threats identified through referral and increase the number of threat assessments provided to individuals making threats.

b) *Outcomes*- Metrics include the number of threats and their levels before the participants attend training and after the participants attend training. The number of threat referrals and source of referral (parent, teacher, student, etc.) will be documented. The number of agency and community presentations will also be documented.

Goal 4--Increase Knowledge of Mental Health Intervention Approaches
a) *Objective*- Increase the number of MH professionals available to provide therapy to individuals who make serious threats. Increase the knowledge of MH professionals of threat assessment process. Increase the number of referrals to mental health professionals for individuals who have made threats.

b) *Outcomes*- Metrics include documented training and presentations to MH professionals on threat assessment process, pre/post survey of MH professionals in community who feel comfortable receiving referrals, number of referrals provided to MH professionals based upon threat assessment recommendations.

How do your learning goals relate to the key elements/approaches that are new, changed or adapted in your project?

These learning goals are directly related to the innovative components previously described, namely, the testing of a new and never-before designed, coordinated, and collaborative training system and model focused on threat assessment.

DATA COLLECTION-2019 INNovation Proposal
The Innovation Project will collect the following data for each goal:
1. The number of each of the participants involved in training or workshops
2. The number of threat assessments conducted, including type of threat, and level of threat
3. The number of mental health referrals provided during the training period stemming from threat assessments
4. The number of case consultation conferences held annually
5. Pre and post assessment/evaluations conducted after each training process

San Luis Obispo County Behavioral Health Services-MHSA Contract
Scope of Project Work
In May of 2020, Holifield Psychological Services, Inc was awarded the contract to officially oversee the B-HARP INNovation grant. In order to translate the original proposal into a scope of work contract, San Luis Obispo County Behavioral Health Services (SLOBHS) crafted the following contractual language as an agreement to develop, coordinate, manage, and evaluate the project. They indicated that Holifield Psychological Services, Inc. would develop and implement a comprehensive, coordinated, collaborative, and empirically based training protocol to educate, assess, and intervene when cases of threats become apparent or imminent across the community related to school and campus settings which may stem from students, parents, or non-affiliated individuals not related to the educational setting.

SLOBHS, further added the definition of a threat. *"A threat is defined and considered as a concerning communication or behavior that indicates that an individual poses a danger to the safety of individuals through acts of violence or other behavior that would cause harm to self or others. A threat can be expressed or communicated behaviorally, orally, visually, in writing, electronically, or through any other means."*

SLOBHS MHSA Program Goals:
SLOBHS noted that the training protocol would include clinical and community-based training topics delivered in a set of six (6) to nine (9) full-day training sessions offered during the thirty (30) months of the testing phase for mental health professionals (MHP), law enforcement (LE), and educational institution staff (EI). HPS, Inc. would also provide education engagement practices in order to decrease criminalization and stigmatization of youth in cases of threats. Additionally, HPS, Inc. would ensure referral, assessment, and monitoring of threats are in place and coordinated as part of the learning and testing phase.

Training Activities-Scope of Work
Clinical Training: HPS, Inc. will provide an intensive one/two (1/2) day trainings for each of the following:
1. **Baseline Training** providing content and didactic learning, experiential activities, role plays, and case conceptualizations;
2. **Supplemental Training** for selected community experts focused on assessment tools and implementation;

3. **Follow-Up Training** to measure and assess knowledge and skill retention
4. **Expansion Training** led by the clinical or community expert and/or the selected community experts who will proctor and impart knowledge and skill-based practices.

Community-Based Training: HPS, Inc. provide two (2) intensive two (2) day trainings for each of the following:

1. **Community System Training** providing content related to interagency communication and collaboration techniques, agency policies and procedures, legal issues, and community monitoring;
2. **Community Supplemental Training** focused on designing, developing, and on-boarding community-based threat assessment cases;
3. **Legal Consultation Training** focused on the legal issues surrounding threat assessment and compliance with regulations;
4. **Community Presentation Training** focused on experts providing educational and learning opportunities to parents, primary caregivers, mental health professionals, educational staff and administration, and community members

SLOBHS MHSA Questions to Answer at Conclusion of B-HARP INNovation Project

1. What are the best approaches for the teaching and training of threat assessment procedures for MHPs, LE and EL staff in a community with limited resources?

2. What are the best components that make an efficient, coordinated, and collaborative system and model related to threat assessment for MHP, LE and EL staff?

3. What are the best methods to increase prevention and early detection and engagement as it relates to threat assessment?

4. How should MHP approach and treat individuals who have made threats or gestures towards homicidal violence?

5. How do we best educate parents, educators, mental health professionals and the community about threat assessment principles and include them in the referral and monitoring process?

6. How do we avoid stigmatization and criminalization of individuals, families, and community members who have participated in the threat assessment process when the threat was not found to be credible?

SECTION 2:

PROJECT TERMINOLOGY

METRICS

AND

PROPOSED OUTCOMES

B-HARP: TERMINOLOGY DEFINITIONS

Project Terminology-***Grant Language and Threat Assessment***

1. *MHSA*-Mental Health Services Act
2. SLOTAP-San Luis Obispo Threat Assessment Project. Original project name until 11/15/2019
3. *B-HARP*-Behavioral Health Assessment and Response Project
4. *SLOBHS*-San Luis Obispo County Behavioral Health Services,
5. *Silos*-A term used in threat assessment and management that references when different individuals, groups, or organizations generate or record information about a similar student of concern or concerning situation, but do integrate or aggregate that information for other parts of the system to view or use in a strategic way. Information stays "siloed" or fragmented rather than connected or integrated.
6. *MH*-Mental Health Silo
7. *EI*-Education Institution Silo
8. *LE*-Law Enforcement Silo
9. *MHP*-Mental Health Professionals
10. *MHET*-Mental Health Evaluation Team-assists the community, hospitals, and law enforcement with Emergency psychiatric evaluation services to determine whether immediate inpatient psychiatric treatment is required; Crisis intervention services and mental health consultations;
11. *Clinical Expert*-Consultant to project to assist in training Level 2 Team in more advanced BTAM skills and consult with Level 2 Team on more complex cases as needed. (Manny Tau, Psy.D., CTM)
12. *Community Expert*-Consultant to project to assist with basic threat assessment team training and provide advice and guidance on community design of threat assessment and management systems and processes. (John Van Dreal, M.A.)
13. *Warning Signs*-Early Behavioral Risk Factors associated with a student who may have potential to carry out targeted violence
14. *BTAM*-Behavioral Threat Assessment & Management
15. *Case Review*-A practice tool where threat assessment trainees have an opportunity to apply their conceptual threat assessment/management knowledge to simulated cases through review with a threat assessment expert.
16. *BTAT*-G-*Behavioral Threat Assessment Test-General*. Multiple-Choice Test used for Level 1 Trainings to measure threat assessment concepts and knowledge. An Attitudes component was added in the Spring 2022 Training.
17. *BTAT*-A- *Behavioral Threat Assessment Test-Advanced.* Multiple-Choice Test used for Level 2 Trainings to measure advanced threat assessment concepts and knowledge
18. *Unique Identifier*- A unique identifier (UID) is a numeric or alphanumeric string that is associated with a single entity within a given survey and data base collection. When completing knowledge and attitude surveys, participants were asked to create their own Unique Identifier. This was meant to keep names and responses of participants in training events confidential.
19. *Level 2 Student Threat Incident Consultation Pilot Protocol*-Threat Incident Pilot Protocol tool used by the Level 2 School Threat Consultation Team.

Project Terminology-***Salem-Keizer/Cascade K-12 Preventative BTAM System (See Appendix 1)***

1. *Professional Discussion*-Step in Process by which School Administrator, School Resource Office, and Mental Health Counselor review threat information and determine need to conduct a Level 1 Threat Assessment.
2. *Level 1 Assessment*-A threat assessment process with 6 Steps and a 20-question Protocol designed in the use with following circumstances:
   a. Threat, aggression, or violence is specific to identified target with motive and plan
   b. Threat, aggression, or violence is causing considerable fear or disruption to activity

  c. Weapon at school or attempt to bring a weapon
  d. There is continued intent to carry out threat
  e. There is a history of threats, aggression, or violence
  f. Staff, parent, or student perceives threatening circumstances
  g. Administrator is unable to determine if a situation poses a risk to school personnel or the community

3. *Level 2 Assessment*-A threat consultation process comprised of community expert members with advanced threat assessment knowledge or having expert knowledge of community interventions/services for youth. The members represent schools, law enforcement agencies, and mental health agencies. A Level 1 School Site Team can request further consultation and community support based upon the intensity of circumstances described above. The community determines whether their School Threat Assessment Consultation Team will be
  a. *Level 2 Community and Investigative*-Use Level 2 system with Investigative Team and Level 2 Investigation Protocol. OR
  b. *Level 2 Community Team Only*-The Level 2 Team gathers the basic demographics of each student, asks the Level 1 team further inquiry and responses regarding risk factors of that case, and then provides further insight and recommends safety management and supervision strategies
  c. *Level 2 Threat Advisory Meetings*-Name of meetings for Level 2 Team to meet, changed to *Level 2 Threat Consultation Team Meetings* at end of grant, per recommendation of Community Expert.

Project Terminology-**Community Engagement and Interagency Collaboration**
1. *Community Engagement-*Building trust among agencies/school districts through commitment of adequate time in partnership development and operating under the assumption that all parties are working collaboratively in good faith to address the chosen problem (i.e., addressing school threats). Engagement activities include agreeing on roles, norms and processes for partnerships using input from all partners and developing common missions, goals, and outcomes.
2. *Inter-Agency Collaboration*-Involves meetings centered around a specific agenda or concept that involves collaboration, input, feedback, and, at times, agreement of the parties involved
  a. *Community Partners Meeting*-Meetings designed to discuss grant goals, activities, outcomes, and Silo systems issues and make suggestions that may enhance or the progress of grant activities. This meeting was designed to be about B-HARP Project/Grant Updates and activities planning with representatives of various community agencies/districts representing each Silo (EI, LE, MH).
  b. *Level 2 School Threat Consultation Team Meetings (a.k.a. Threat Advisory)*- Community Members carry-out the activities of the Level 2 Threat Consultation Team by hearing, discussing, and providing support for Level 1 team presenting cases.
3. *Informational Presentations to Community*- A formal requested presentation by an agency representing a Silo or a community event/organization. The presentation must have been scheduled and made to an agency, school district, or public about B-HARP and nature of grant project
4. *B-SAVE*-Student Video Project Class PSA Project on Warning Signs

B-HARP METRICS or MEASURES USED
Training Metrics
Baseline, Supplemental, and Follow-Up Trainings
1. Knowledge Measures
  a. *Level 1 BTAT-G*-An 18 items multiple-choice test measuring several aspects of the Level 1 (General) Training, Salem-Keizer Protocol, and basic threat assessment principles.
  b. *Level 2 BTAT-A*-A 14-item multiple-choices test measuring several aspects of the Level 2 (Advanced Training) and more in-depth threat assessment and management principles.

2. Case Review Applications
    a. *Level 2-Case Review Score Sheet (2021)*-A Structured Score Sheet developed to assess Level 2 team members threat assessment and management application skills. It was divided into 8 key areas that the Clinical Expert determine and rated as important that Level 2 participants grasp for each presented case (See Appendix 4).
    b. *Participant Attendance* at Level 1 and 2 Training Events-Number of unduplicated attendees at each scheduled case review
3. Attitude Measures
    a. *Level 1 Training Attitudes (Spring 2022- Winter 2023)*- For the BTAT-G the Attitude Section measured participants' agreement with 9 statements on threat assessment on a 6–point Likert scale, and was present in both pre and post-test. Focused on individual's confidence and perception of applying threat assessment and management skills.

Expansion Trainings
1. Knowledge Measures
    a. *Mental Health Providers Training Knowledge Test (2021)*-An 18-Item True/False Knowledge Test based upon warning signs and basic threat assessment principles.
    b. *Teacher Training Knowledge Test (2022)*-A 13-Item-True/False Test based upon the B-HARP Project-Salem-Keizer terminology, behavioral warning signs, NTAC studies, and definition and purpose of threat assessment.
    c. *Community Adult Training Knowledge Test (2022)*-A 14 Item True/False Test that has items related to behavioral warning signs and threat assessment and management principles
2. Attitude/Opinion Measures (see Appendix 9)
    a. *Mental Health Providers Opinion*s (2021)-A 7-Item 5-Point Likert Scale that had respondents rate their opinions on various aspects of threat assessment and mental health practices.
    b. *Teacher Training Attitudes* (2022)- An initial 5-point Likert scale then changed to a 6-point Likert Scale
    c. *Adult Training Attitudes*-(2022)-An 8-item 6-point Likert Scale designed to explore perceptions regarding threat related situations.

Community Engagement Metrics
Community engagement measure examine attendance by community members at an interagency event whether it be a Level-2 Training, Level 2 Threat Consultation Team Meeting, Community Partner Meeting, or attendance at Professional Information Presentation about the B-HARP grant and training activities.

B-HARP PROPOSED OUTCOMES

Key Outcomes for B-HARP-SLOBHS- INNovation MHSA
1. Project participants will demonstrate a thirty percent (30%) increase in the level of skill and knowledge to identify and prevent school and community threats.
    a. Knowledge measured by multiple-choice and T-F questionnaires
    b. Skill measured by application of the community process and school-based protocol.
2. Thirty percent (30%) increase of interagency collaboration through the development and use of the coordinated and collaborative training system and model for threat assessment.
    a. Measured by partner and member attendance at Community Partner and Level 2 Meetings.
3. Ten percent (10%) decrease in number of apparent or potential threats identified through referral.
    a. A reduction or decrease could not be measured. Instead, a breakdown of reported threats will be provided to show threats dismissed as not concerning (Professional Discussion-Dismissed), threats warranting further investigation (Level 1) and threats warranting further community team consultation (Level 2).

4. Ten percent (10%) increase of the number of mental health professionals available to provide therapy as defined by the threat assessment team or report recommendations.
   a. Measured by the number of attendees of the Mental Health Provider Training
   b. Measured by Percentage of Attendees and Mental Health Provider who responded to participation in a network of community providers with B-HARP.

Units of Service for HPS, Inc.-SLOHBHS-INNovation MHSA

Units Defined:
1. *Participants* = Unduplicated individual receiving the BHARP training protocol comprised of the Clinical and Community-Based Trainings.
2. *Training Protocol* = Trainings delivered in a set of six (6) to nine (9) full-day training sessions offered during the thirty (30) months of the testing phase.
3. *Training Areas* = Specific training topics that will include:
   a. *Clinical Training* = Training topics include the following: a baseline training, a supplemental training, a follow-up training, and an expansion training.
   b. *Community-Based Training* = Training topics include the following: a community system training, a community supplemental training, a legal consultation training, and a community presentation training.
4. *Expert Group* = Unduplicated participants identified and selected as experts attending consultation or other higher-level knowledge and skill practices related to clinical and community-based approaches to threat assessment.

Minimum Annual Units:
1) Seventy-five to one hundred (75-100) unduplicated participants enrolled in the training program for testing period shall receive the full training program.
2) One (1) Training Protocol that spans throughout the testing and training phase.
3) Four (4) Clinical Training sessions focused on each of the following topics: baseline training, supplemental training, follow-uptraining, and expansion training.
4) Four (4) Community-Based Training sessions focused on each of the following topics: community system training, community supplemental training, legal consultation training, and community presentation training.
5) Fifteen (15) to twenty (20) Experts identified and selected throughout the testing and training period.

SECTION 3:

REVIEW OF PROJECT: FISCAL YEAR HIGHLIGHTS

Project Story and Final Year Summary: Key Highlights
Proposal Year-Fiscal Year-2018-2019-Project Proposal
The original MHSA Innovation Grant Proposal for the B-HARP began as the San Luis Obispo Threat Assessment Project (SLOTAP) in November of 2018. After several reiterations in the proposal, the SLOTAP project was submitted by SLO County Behavioral Health to the state MHSA Innovation Grant Review Committee in March of 2019. During this period, it was indicated that the state was utilizing a new review protocol for all grant proposals submitted during that year. Different from previous years, this process extended well into the first 6 months of Fiscal Year 2019-2020.

Year 1-Fiscal Year-2019-2020 -Project Approval, MHSA Contract Begins
From August to September of 2019 input was provided by reviewers and Dr. Holifield responded with information of the SLOTAP project to the reviewers' queries. One expectation was that Dr. Holifield had to remove the word *"Threat"* from the name of the program. It was viewed as being a word that might stigmatize persons with mental health concerns. After several name iterations, Frank Warren, Nestor Veloz-Passlacqua, and Dr. Holifield agreed on the current name of the project which was finally approved by the state, B-HARP.

Throughout the early months of 2020, B-HARP experienced some unanticipated set-backs. Due to the high amount of the grant award, the grant had to go through SLO County's RFP process. This process required Dr. Holifield to re-apply for his own project as well as allow for other potential applicants to offer a bid on the grant. This process lasted from February until a final contract signing in May of 2020. During this period, the COVID-19 Pandemic was beginning to take hold in the United States in February of 2020 and by April of 2020, schools, government agencies, and businesses in California were in an unprecedented lock-down.

Year 2-Fiscal Year-2020-2021 -Training Begins
Resources such as the expertise of both John Van Dreal and Dr. Tau, the Association of Threat Assessment Professionals (ATAP) Core Standards, and the U.S. Secret Service Threat Assessment Principles (Fein, 2004) were utilized as standards for identifying relevant threat assessment content for both the General (Level 1) and Advanced (Level 2) Training. In turn, the training content and standards were used in developing the Pre-Post B-HARP Threat Assessment Training Test for both tests. These tests were labeled as such:

B-HARP Threat Assessment Test-General Training (BTAT-G)
B-HARP Threat Assessment Test-Advanced Training (BTAT-A)

The first B-HARP Trainings included a Level 1 General and a Level 2 Advanced Training, which took place over the course of two days, September 29th and 30th, 2020. Restrictions from COVID-19 included participants completing the Pre and Post Tests electronically, via Survey Monkey and the training being conducted via a Zoom Platform. Follow-up Trainings were also provided by expert, John Van Dreal, to Coast Unified School and San Luis Coastal Unified School District. A Level 2 B-HARP Team Training Syllabus was developed to maintain training fidelity, create a team atmosphere in case review, and practice analyzing complex threat assessment cases. Attendance for these team meetings fluctuated throughout the year, which can be attributed to job turnover for members and impacts of COVID-19 with agencies prioritizing other agendas. Partner Meetings continued to take place from the beginning of the grant application in 2019 and effort was made to contact potential partners. For more insight in the demographics of the Partners, refer to previous yearly reports.

Year 3-Fiscal Year-2021-2022 -Training Demand Increases and Level 1 Protocol Use
In 2021, B-HARP hosted a Level 1 General, Level 1 Refresher, Mental Health, and Level 2 Advanced Training. Through the Mini Grant, an additional Level 1 Training as well as an Adult Community Training. The first Teacher Training was conducted January 3rd at Loma Vista Community School and another later

February 16th from Coast Unified School District. The assessments for the trainings were modified to include attitude and evaluation components. This informed B-HARP of the effectiveness of the training and prompted shifts in training objectives. The Paso Robles Daily News and KSBY News released articles which addressed B-HARP Trainings or asked for a comment on a related topic. B-HARP was given a mini-grant that allowed for an additional Level 1 Training. It also allowed for the creation of a student-led Video Project that educated students on the warning signs of severe acts of targeted violence, how to report signs, and what happens once a concern has been reported. Outside of the grant goals, an unanticipated activity presented itself in which there was an opportunity to address state policy makers about B-HARP goals and activities by testifying at the Senate Education Committee.

Year 4-Fiscal Year-2022-2023 –Implementing and Testing Level 2-Interagency Collaboration
The Final Year of the B-HARP INNovation grant, began after a successful training year, numerous informational presentations to the community, and increased use of the Level 1 Protocol by school districts. The planning and goals for this year focused on further piloting the implementation of the Level 2 Team Consultation Meeting Process. At Community Partner Meetings and Level 2 Threat Advisory Meetings (School Threat Consultation Meetings), procedures were created, discussed, and edited and a revised MOU was sent to school districts, Behavioral Health agencies reflective of the changes. The goal was to measure the process of the Level-2 Threat Advisory Team Meetings in terms of student cases referred or brought before the team. This process oversaw the discussion and documentation (for grant purposes) of the interagency collaboration and cooperation on twelve cases brought to the meetings. In September of 2022, SLOBHS MHSA gave permission for the B-HARP Level 2 Protocol and Process to be tested with an extension to March of 2023. The extension was to allow for the impact of COVID-19 delays.

In June, July, and August, a *Level 2 Student Threat Incident Consultation Pilot Protocol* was crafted with the input from both Clinical Experts and Community Experts. It was intended for use by a small group of designated professionals on the Level 2 Team to use a supplementary consultation using interview forms and criteria to provide a more in-depth review of the concerns from the Level 1 Team. This protocol was Beta Tested for one highly, complex case that had shared components form all three Silos (educational institutions, law enforcement, and mental health). The Clinical Expert also assisted in reviewing the information.

Given the piloted nature of this process in the community, as cases were being heard, several challenges became clear. With the complex nature of the issues, as well as the Beta Test of the Level 2 Protocol, questions began to arise among a few community partners about the process of information collection, sharing, and dissemination. The Beta Test of the Level 2 Protocol, given the complex issues and multi-district and multi-agency involvement required that several of the community partners communicate with each other at higher administrative level. In response to the complexity, the SLOBHS MHSA Team, Director of SLOBHS, SLOBHS Quality Assurance, SLOBHS County Counsel, and SLOBHS Division Director of Youth Services, met along with Dr. Holifield, Owen Lemm (Assistant Grant Coordinator) and the Dr. Manny Tau, B-HARP Clinical Expert. In this meeting the complexities of the some of the Level 2 case scenarios were discussed as well as the use of the Level 2 Threat Incident Consultation Pilot Protocol with a single case. This meeting led to an agreement to seek additional legal review input about the structure, process, and procedures of the Level 2 Process. Holifield Psychological Services, Inc. with the permission of SLOBHS sought a contract and retainer for a law firm to provide this feedback. This legal feedback was not available by the March 1st end point of the grant activities and therefore none of the suggestions could be implemented, but did arrive towards the end of the fiscal year to provide some guidance to the community moving forward.

Several key highlights that occurred towards the end of the grant were that B-HARP was further elevated at both the state and national levels. Dr. Holifield and Owen Lemm presented a 3-hour workshop at the California Association of School Psychologists (CASP) Annual Conference in Universal City in October of 2022. In March of 2023, Dr. Holifield presented a 2-Hour Workshop at The National Association of School

Psychologists Annual Conference in Denver, CO. Although the content of both workshops focused on threat assessment and management principles, the B-HARP INNovation Grant was reviewed which included the goals and activities and key highlights of community engagement.

For the grant goals themselves, two major highlights were the piloting of the Level 2 community consultation process. This was discussed earlier and will be discussed in more detail later in the report, but it was a crucial component and the final opportunity to test community engagement and interagency collaboration. School districts reported using the Level 1 Protocol and were increasingly participating in reporting aggregate data for the grant project.

Finally, in February 2023, B-HARP hosted its largest training, with sixty-nine attendees. This training also saw the highest turnout for Law Enforcement participants than in any previous training. One point to note is it was the first training that executed all of the aspects that the grant proposal originally envisioned. Having a two-day, in-person training event that allowed for lecture format, team discussions, and breakout meetings for case reviews was well-received by the attendees.

SECTION 4:

B-HARP PROJECT TRAINING

RESULTS

AND

OUTCOMES

III. B-HARP TRAININGS: ATTENDANCE AND OUTCOMES

Clinical Trainings:

Given that the B-HARP grant original proposal language prior to adopting the Salem-Keizer/Cascade Threat Assessment Model we provided a table below listing the grant training activities using all training aspects under each original grant proposal category. For example, in interpreting our Baseline Training, we applied the Level 1 Training providing the clinical content through expert presentation and didactic learning, experiential activities, role plays, and case conceptualizations. The Level 1 General and Refresher Trainings are examples of a Baseline Training. Participants at these trainings were professionals either assigned to a district's threat assessment team or interacted with the district teams (e.g., school resource officer).

Follow-Up Training

The Follow-Up Training was originally conceptualized to measure and assess knowledge and skill retention as a repeated training from the Baseline. However, adjustments had to be made during the COVID-19 Pandemic as district and agency personnel were inconsistently or not available for participation in grant activities. The decision was made to apply any specific district request for a review of the Level 1 Protocol following their attendance at a General or Refresher Level 1 event. This also applied to any Level 1 Case Reviews specific to a school district. Any Level 1 District Specific Training focused on review of the protocol or specific case reviews using Level 1 Protocol. These included the Follow-Up Trainings with San Luis Coastal Unified, Coast Unified, Templeton Unified School, and Lucia Mar Unified school districts. Attendees were limited to individuals that worked at those schools. Measurement was either taken using the BTAT-G or attendance if a Case Review.

Supplemental Trainings

The Supplemental Trainings were adjusted to reflect the Level 2 Training for selected community experts focused. These training events can be viewed as both a clinical training as well as community systems training. The trainings provided attendees with advanced threat assessment and management training on topics threat assessment tools and case reviews.

Community Trainings:

The Expansion Training (expanding to the community) were led by the clinical or community expert and/or the selected community experts who would proctor and impart knowledge and skill-based practices.

Expansion Training

The Expansion Training that B-HARP conducted were the Mental Health Providers Training, Teacher Training, and the Adult Training. B-HARP conducted trainings that were specifically held for Therapists and other Mental Health Providers. The participants that attended the Teacher Trainings were strictly limited to teachers only.

However, for the Adult Training, one of the goals of the training was outreach into the community about the project as well as introduced threat assessment principles, so attendees held various kinds of occupations including small business owner (security firm), psychiatric state hospital team, District Attorney's Office, law enforcement, and a community-based organization that provided mental health support.

Number of Trainings and Unduplicated Participants

Table 1: Clinical and Community Trainings from 2020-2023

Year	Baseline	Supplemental	Follow-Up	Expansion (Community Training)
2020	Level 1 General	Level 2 Advanced		
2021	Level 1 Refresher Level 1 General	Level 2 Advanced -Level 2 Team Case Reviews**	Level 1 Case Review Level 1 Case Review	Mental Health Provider Training
2022	Level 1 General	Level 2 Case Review/ Pilot Level 2 Protocol	Level 1 Protocol Training	Teacher Training 1 Teacher Training 2 Adult Training-1
2023	Level 1 General		Level 1 Protocol Training	

*Attendance Only, Participants Not Identified
**Duplicated Attendance, Participants Not Identified

In examining Table 1 above, a total of 17 clinical and community trainings were provided in the 30-month program period. From 2019-2023, there were five baseline training events, four supplemental training events, four follow-up training events, and four expansion training events [Table 1].

Training Attendance: Unduplicated Participant Attendance
As established in the Project Goals,

Table 2: Unduplicated Participants per Training per Year

Year*	Baseline	Supplemental	Follow-Up	Expansion
FY 2020-2021	47	3	37	0
FY 2021-22	46	5	0	83
FY 2022-23	48	13	47	19
Total:	**141**	**21**	**84**	**102**

* Fiscal Year=July 1 to June 30th

Table 3: Unduplicated Participants per Year

Year	Unduplicated Participants
FY 20-21	87
FY 21-22	134
FY 22-23	127
Total From All Four Years	**348**

B-HARP provided a total of 17 trainings with **two** in **2020**, **seven** in **2021**, **six** in **2022**, and **two** in **2023**. Due to the first four surveys not including information about attending a previous B-HARP training, we could not account for unduplicated participants for some of these trainings. When a participant review was conducted across the 17 trainings examining "Unique Identifiers", found 50 duplicated participants. It was estimated the

actual amount is larger due to the attendance only trainings mentioned above that did not require the use of "unique identifiers "such as Supplemental and Follow-Up Case Reviews.

A prominent B-HARP Goal was seventy-five to one hundred (75-100) unduplicated participants, annually, enrolled in the training program. No training occurred during FY 19-20 due to the COVID 19 Pandemic and administrative delays on a state level that resulted in grant activities being pushed back. 348 unduplicated individuals participated in the span of four years [Table 3]. This goal was met or exceeded each fiscal year from 2FY020-2021-FY2 022-2023.

Figure 1: Percentage of Level 1 Training Participants by Silo, 2019-2023

Figure 1 above shows the percentage of participants who provided their professional affiliation when attending the Level 1 Trainings over the course of the B-HARP grant. As expected, the majority of professional were from the Education Silo. Mental Health comprised nearly 40% of the attendees trained, while Law Enforcement represented 1/5th of the participants.

TRAINING OUTCOMES-Clinical Trainings
Clinical Training Outcomes: Level 1

From September of 2020 to October of 2021, the BTAT-G contained only a knowledge measure. In 2022, the assessments were modified to include attitude and evaluation components. The attitude section measured participants' agreement with various statements on threat assessment on a Likert scale, and was present in both pre and post-test for measurement purposes. The evaluation component was present in the post-training survey and had the purpose of soliciting participant feedback on numerous aspects of the training.

Knowledge Section: BTAT-G
The original goal for the long-term outcome from the grant for Goal 1 was a thirty percent (30%) increase in the level of skill and knowledge to identify and prevent school and community threats. Table 4 shows the percent increase in knowledge for both aggregate pre-post) and matched pre-post (adjusted for unique identifier answering both the Pre-Post BTAT-G for training).

Table 4: Percent Knowledge Increase for Aggregate and Matched Pairs for Level 1 Training

Level 1 Training	BTAT-G Pre	N	BTAT-G Post	N	Percent Increase
Aggregate (Groups)	67.44	144	77.03	110	**14.21**
Matched	70.94	80	78.07	80	**10.05**

As demonstrated in Table 4, a 30% increase was never attained for all Level 1 Trainings from October of 2022 to February 2023. For further analysis, a breakdown of each individual training and percentage increase is shown in Appendix 2. The percent increase in Knowledge ranged from five to twenty-seven percent (5% to 27%) with an average of fifteen percent (15%) increase across all Level 1 Trainings.

Several factors that could have limited the pre-training to post-training knowledge score increase. These include previous threat assessment experience and previous B-HARP training exposure. In order to examine this, we included two questions in the demographic section of the training survey. We asked prior training, threat assessment experience, and number of estimated threat assessment reports complete (see Appendix 3).

Despite a 30% increase not being met and the factors described above the increase was statistically significant. Using a statistical analysis using a T-Test examining a sample of 104 Aggregate Group participants found statistically significant differences beyond chance alone at the specified p-value < .05, t (103) = 2.89, d= 0.49.

Attitudes Section:
In 2022, an Attitude Section was added to the Pre-test to provide insight into changes in confidence and sentiments surrounding crucial areas of threat assessment from before the training to afterwards. Attitudes were measured on a six-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Agree to Strongly Disagree, with no neutral option offered.

Three of the nine questions asked were found to have a statistically significant positive change using a T-Test comparing the Aggregate Groups. The following Attitude items are listed below with their increases.:

"I feel confident in my knowledge of threat assessment principles,"
[30% confidence increase Pre-Training to Post-Training]

"I feel confident in organizing and coordinating a threat assessment team to perform a threat assessment,"
[36% confidence increase Pre-Training to Post-Training]

"I feel confident in my ability to develop and manage a safety plan following a threat assessment."
[31% confidence increase Pre-Training to Post-Training]

The questions align with verbal and written feedback in demonstrating that participants felt more confident in their knowledge and capabilities of managing threat assessments after the training than prior to the training.

Challenges:
As the trainings began, the original goal of 30 % percent increase from the Pre-test to the Post-test fell short among the aggregate data. When utilizing a figure that could be used to show the positive impact that the training has on participants' knowledge, 30% likely very high considering the other factors described earlier related to previous threat assessment knowledge, training, and experience in the field. (See Appendix 3). A little over half of professionals (55%) had reported less than 5 years of experience participating in threat assessments. Most participants reported receiving very little threat assessment training (86%) and a large

majority of participants (67%) reported that they had not participated in writing a threat assessment report writing.

A major factor was trying to consistently measure Level 1 Knowledge across varying Level 1 presentation formats during COVID-19 and then after COVID-19 restrictions ceased. The early challenge of getting participants to complete both the Pre and Post-test quickly became evident as people would leave the trainings on Zoom and not complete the post-surveys. In reviewing Level 1 Training Attendance and Pre-Test completion rates, on average about twenty-five percent (25%) of participants filled out the Pre-test and Pos-Test together. Many completed the Pre-Test with a drop in Post-Test completion. However, it should be noted that in the final two in-person trainings, completion rates increased.

Successes and Key Highlights:
The key success of B-HARP had throughout these last few years was an overall interest in the Level 1 trainings. The interest in B-HARP by school personnel and law enforcement showed through the attendance data. The exception of the two-day training in Fall of 2021, by which attendance levels were unprecedentedly low and most likely due to the increase in COVID-19 and availability for personnel to attend. Overall, there was a consistent turnout of participants for both online and in-person training events. The key highlight from above was the significance of gains in knowledge. More importantly the increase in participants' confidence in threat assessment knowledge, ability to coordinate a threat assessment team, and ability to create and manage a safety plan is valuable data to augment the knowledge increases. Knowledge of threat assessment concepts are important but confidence in execution of a threat assessment and management in the moment is critical, especially if a large percentage of professionals have not conducted or completed a threat assessment report.

From the Spring 2022 Level 1 Training, 90% of participants selected strongly agree or agree when asked if the presentation helped "improve my understanding of threat assessment." Ninety percent of participants selected strongly agree or agree when asked if the presentation helped them "understand the process of responding to student threats." We included quotable feedback from two participants listed below:

 "This training was informative and long overdue. As a school counselor, training and "next step" (i.e. response team) has always been lacking and a huge barrier to getting support. It was clear that the presenters are experts in their field and made me feel confident in what I was learning. Please, please provide more trainings. Thank you."

"*Well use of my time. Built hope in my ability to potentially save lives.*"

Clinical Training Outcomes-Level 2
Knowledge-BTAT-A
For the first two years of the grant, measure of advanced threat assessment knowledge was evaluated using the BTAT-A. In late October, 2020 and in 2021, the Level- 2 took place with a select group of individuals who had progressed through the General Training, many who had attended the Level 1 Refresher Training. The overall configuration of the Advanced Training was identical to the General Training with regards to virtual environment, and registration and assessment processes. Below are the results of the Level 2 Team:

Table 5: Percent Increase for Supplemental Trainings: Level 2 BTAT-A

Training	Pre-Percent Correct	Post-Percent Correct	% Increase
2020 Level 2	75.00	86.73	**15.65**
2021 Level 2	60.00	90.48	**50.79**
			Average: 33.22

The total score of the BTAT-A Pre and Post test is 14 points. Participants who completed the BTAT-A Pre-Assessment, average score for the Pre-Assessment was 75% correct and 60% correct, respectively for 2020 and 2021. For the BTAT-A Post-Assessment Analysis, there was significant improvement overall for the 2021 training than 2020. The Average Percent Increase in Knowledge between both trainings was above the 30% benchmark for knowledge increase.

Case Reviews-Clinical Applications-Level 2
The original goal for the B-HARP project was to have the community experts begin conducting threat assessment post training. In the 2018-2019 proposal it was conceptualized that the B-HARP Team would present actual cases to the Clinical Expert. The expert would provide expert feedback and suggestions to the team. However, due to COVID-19 restrictions and schools having online learning, the focus of the educational partners was health related concerns, not school violence. None of the partners reported incidents of school threats during this period.

To address this issue, Dr. Holifield created a Level 2 B-HARP Team Training Syllabus. The purpose of this training series was to maintain training fidelity, create a team atmosphere in case review, and practice analyzing complex threat assessment cases. A training syllabus was crafted to reflect specialized topics such as interviewing and debriefing as well as 7 cases to be presented by the clinical expert. A B-HARP Level 2 Case Organizer was created for Level 2 Team members to organize the case information as they read it into specific threat assessment and management areas to be evaluated by the Clinical Expert.

After each Level 2 Case Team Revie2, brief feedback was provided by the expert. The Clinical Expert would score the team on each section of the Case Organizer, so that the team could pinpoint areas of improvement. A sample of the Level 2 Score Sheet is provided in Appendix 4 and closely aligns with Level 2 Team Organizer.

The practice exercises ran from January 2021 to June 2021, with the syllabus covering the majority of the 2021-2022 school year. Partner participation in the Level 2 Trainings started at nearly 100 percent, and then declined through May as the team members experienced an increased workload at their school sites. Several team members transitioned into other positions within their fields and left the training. One of the law enforcement team members was required to take time away due to an injury. As the end of the school year approached, the attendance of team members increased. This may have been due in part to the addition of a few new members to the group during the time period. Multiple team members who were not able to attend the meetings live requested the meetings be recorded so they could review content and keep up with the material being covered.

Figure 2: Level 2 Team Percent Accuracy by Case

The Level 2 B-HARP Team was found to have increased their threat assessment abilities in the 6-month span of the training, averaging a 66% overall score on the Clinical Expert's rubric from the first four Case Studies and 95% in the latter three Case Studies. This increase was observed despite of the Clinical Expert increasing the difficulty of the cases each time. Dr. Tau did not provide this information to the Project Director and Level 2 Team until after the last case. Thus Level 2 Team participants were unaware (blind) to the increase in difficulty and complexity, yet made gains in accuracy overtime.

In order to examine amount of increased Level 2 Team accuracy in applying threat assessment knowledge to case conceptualization and formulation, further analysis was conducted. This analysis is presented in the table below.

Table 6: Percent Increase in Case Formulation Accuracy of Level 1 Team Across Number of Cases

Percent Change Case 1 to Case 5	Percent Change Case 1 to Case 7
111.15%	99.41%

In examining the table above, the percent increase was estimated from Case 1 to Case 5 and Case 1 to Case 7, representing the highest accuracy along with accuracy attained at the final case. The goal of 30% accuracy was far exceeded by the percentages in the table and represents a significant increase.

TRAINING OUCOMES-COMMUNITY TRAININGS
Community Trainings-Systems, Models, and Specialized Content
At the time of the proposal, it was original conceptualized that there would be experts providing presentations related to interagency communication and collaboration techniques, agency policies and procedures, legal issues, and community monitoring, and specialized content to the community. The original goal was to have professional present several approaches to community-based threat assessment in terms of systemic approaches. As local experts were identified, trained, and

On May 26th and 27th of 2020, there were two community trainings of previous MHSA INNovation grant programs related to threat assessment, the **School Threat Assessment Response Team (START)** out of Los Angeles County Department of Behavioral Health and the **System-wide Mental Health Assessment Response Team (SMART)**, from Glenn County Behavioral Health. Each presented to our 2020 community partners about their programs and how they are organized and utilized in each respective county. Basic threat

assessment processes were presented and discussed. Attendance for these presentations is presented below by Silo:

Table 7: Silo Member Attendance at Initial Community Threat Assessment Presentations

SILO	SMART Community Presentation	START Community Presentation
Education	6	4
Mental Health	1	2
Law Enforcement	2	2
Total Attendance	**9**	**8**

At the December 2020. Partner's Meeting, John Van Dreal provided an hour Community Partner's Training discussing the Level 2 Community Model to the partners in attendance. During this meeting, John discussed the Salem-Keizer/Cascade System in relation to the B-HARP project. Several approaches were discussed and the role of the B-HARP Team. The choices were whether the pilot project would be Level –2 Community Team-Consultation Only with more of a consultative approach or an investigative body which would encompass the consultative role, but also dig deeper into the investigative process and assist in the higher-level threat assessment (Level –2 Community Team Consultative and Investigative). In the end a final decision was made by the group to structure the B-HARP Team as an Investigative Team. (See Appendix 7).

November 2022 Advanced Community Training

At the Level 2 Training in November 2022, Courtenay McCarthy, a school psychologist, Certified Threat Manager, and associate of John Van Dreal in implementing the Salem Keizer Cascade K-12 System, reintroduced the systems to the Community Team. Courtenay led the team in a full day training that served both first time and experienced team members. The morning portion was spent reviewing advanced threat assessment principles. In a change from the previous trainings, there was no pre or post training surveys, as Level 2 Team Members and the B-HARP grant team wanted to focus on case studies, and ask questions of a national level threat assessment expert. The team simulated complex threat assessment cased from beginning to end with the guidance of McCarthy. The was also the first time to use the Level 2 Student Threat Incident Consultation Pilot Protocol with simulated cases.

Thirteen (13) Level 2 Team members were present, with all three silos (Mental Health, Education and Law Enforcement) represented. This training proved especially beneficial when considering the timing and phase of the community team, as B-HARP had begun testing the protocol with actual cases in the community. The project was entering a point in the grant with more cases and discussion of cases than any other moment in the project period. The B-HARP Level-2 members present provided positive feedback towards all facets of the training. The highest praise was during feedback reserved for two components: walking through simulated case studies practicing the Pilot Protocol as the Level 2 Threat Consultation Team and soliciting expert advice on existing or past cases that the Level 2 Team had encountered.

Legal Consultation Training
One of the original INNovation grant proposal and activity ideas in FY 2018-2019, was that, once all partners had been trained and community, there would be a large community presentation on the legal aspects of threat assessment and management. Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic delayed the training access and community pilot implementation by 18-20 months. This delay forced a shift in trying to achieve other aspects of the grant activities and goals. Furthermore, it is difficult to find specific law firms that are familiar with the intricacies of threat assessment and management. This would have taken additional time to research and locate professionals. Thus, a formal legal community training related to threat assessment was not provided

during the grant. However, there were identifiable grant activities related to this goal that are mentioned in this section.

In May of 2022, following the Community Violence Prevention (Adult) Threat Assessment Training, Dr. Holifield connected San Luis Obispo County's District Attorney's with Andrija Lopez, San Diego County Deputy DA who created and chairs the School Threat Assessment Team ("STAT"). The STAT is a multi-disciplinary team that convenes to discuss challenging school threat cases. The team works collaboratively to identify resources to assist a juvenile in need while taking any necessary steps to ensure public safety. She is the team leader for all case issuance as well as the team leader for all school threat cases at the juvenile division. Ms. Lopez has reviewed and prosecuted over 200 school threat cases. And co-authored the San Diego County School Threat Protocol in 2018 which has been shared with law enforcement partners throughout California & across the country.

Ms. Lopez met with San Luis Obispo County's District Attorney's Office. Feedback from the meeting indicated it was highly productive. The connection and meeting among our local key law enforcement agency with an established threat advisory program housed within a District Attorney's Office was considered a key instructive step forward in understanding how San Luis Obispo County may understand and integrate threat assessment and management practices within several local partner agencies.

As mentioned earlier, the once the Level 2 Process and Pilot Protocol was implemented in September of 2022, a meeting was held in late October to further discuss the process. In November of 2022, SLOBHS gave Dr. Holifield permission and fiscal support to seek an independent law firm, Hirschfeld and Kramer LLP, who specialize in in threat assessment legal review, workplace violence, and FERPA related to threats at institutions of higher education to review and provide legal feedback regarding the B-HARP Level 2 Community Structure and Process. The law firm met with Dr. Holifield and Owen Lemm and were provided with the most recent MOU and all Level 2 documents related to the Level 2 Procedures and Process. At the time of the writing of this report, a Legal Opinion Letter was provided to Holifield Psychological Services, Inc. as well as the County Counsel of San Luis Obispo and District Attorney's Office.

Expansion Training Outcomes:

Community Presentation Training focused on experts providing educational land learning opportunities to parents, primary caregivers, mental health professionals, educational staff and administration, and community members.

Teacher Trainings
The teaching training series was designed to educate school teachers and staff on warning signs and concerning behaviors that are often present leading up to an attack, and detail what teachers should do once they have identified concerning behaviors (Ahman, et al. 2017; NTAC 2018). The curriculum focused on recognizing and reporting, and educates teachers about threat assessment and management and a teacher's role in the threat assessment process. It was designed to be a link to the school district Level 1 Teams (counselors, psychologists, administrators, and school resource officers, who participated in the B-HARP Level 1 Trainings. Teachers are at the forefront of threat assessment as bystander reporters, as they closely interact with students daily and are key contributors to both reporting at the initial point of a threat as well as participating in an ongoing safety management plan following a threat that was deemed concerning and validated through a threat assessment.

Knowledge Section:
The original goal for the long-term outcome from the grant for Goal 3 was a thirty percent (30%) increase in the level of skill and knowledge to identify and prevent school and community threats. As you can see in Table 8 below, the Teacher Trainings had, roughly, a sixty percent (60%) increase in knowledge from Pre to

Post-test. This is almost double the original increase estimation. Moreover, a statistical analysis using a T-Test with a p-value < .05 for statistically significant difference, found a t (71) =3.81, d= 0.40 showing the strength of the increase.

Respondents were from a small school district which consisted of two separate trainings for middle and high school teachers and an elementary school. Another training was provided at a county community school for school staff working with students who had been expelled from school districts due to high-risk behaviors (community school) and for school staff from a school which provided special education services for students with emotional and behavioral disabilities.

Table 8: Percent Increase for Expansion Trainings

School Site Training	Pre-%Correct	Post-% Correct	% Increase
Loma Vista Community School	56.03	90.33	**61.21**
Coast Unified School District	65.33	80.14	**60**

Attitude Section:
The Teacher Attitude statement items (Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree) were designed to show how confident teachers felt about understanding their school's threat assessment process and the role they play in it. Additional items were crafted to understand feelings about school shootings, in general and at their own school. The final section of items explored of how strong the teachers believe their capabilities are in participating in threat assessments. After some analysis on these questions, there were a few that had a significant positive increase from disagreeing to agreeing with the statement. These consisted of items listed below:

"Teachers know what to look for regarding concerning student behaviors"

"I understand my school's process once a concerning behavior has been reported"

"I understand my role in my school's threat assessment process"

The significant increase in these items further validated the increase in Teacher Knowledge by leaving teacher's feeling more confident about not only identifying threats, but understanding their role in taking action in their school's threat assessment network throughout the threat assessment and management process.

Mental Health Provider (MHP) Training

Titled *Triaging Dangerous Behaviors in Therapy,* this October 2021 three-hour training was a collaboration between Dr. Holifield and Dr. Manny Tau (Clinical Expert). It was specifically designed for mental health providers in San Luis Obispo County, especially those who might not have been to a B-HARP training Level 1. That training previously had only been offered to mental health providers working with school district threat assessment teams. The MHP training was designed to meet Goal 4 and educate mental health professionals on warning signs, psychological risk factors, BTAM principles, and professional reporting obligations should clients make threats. It was designed to be a community link presentation to educate therapists in the community about the basic process school threat assessment teams were conducting and to work with those teams if having a shared student and client. Participants were offered three hours of Continuing Education credit for attendance and 35 of the 50 participants fully completed both the Mental Health Provider Pre-Test and Post-Test.

Mental Health Professionals were asked where their primary mental health professional activities were conducted.

- 31% responded School or University-based institutions
- 20% responded Community Mental Health Agency-County
- 34% responded Community Mental Health Agency-Non-Profit
- 8% responded to Private Mental Health Practice
- 6% responded Other

The participants focused on all age groups in their practices with the majority reported working primarily with clients ages 13-24. In a key question that highlighted the need for the training, *82% of participants reported that they have worked with individuals who have made targeted threats towards others.*

Knowledge Section:
Below are takeaways from the Mental Health Professionals Knowledge Test. For the MHP Knowledge Test there was a Maximum Test Score=10.

Table 9: Percent Knowledge Increase for Aggregate and Matched Pairs for MHP Training

MHP	MHP Pre	N	MHP Post	N	Percent Increase
Aggregate (Groups)	67.96	35	85.00	22	**25.08**
Matched	69	20	85	20	**23.19**

In examining the data above, there was an increase by Mental Health Provider participants in their understanding of warning signs, psychological risk factors, BTAM principles, and professional reporting obligations should clients make threats.

Opinion Section:
In the Mental Health Providers Opinion Section, items were designed in a 5-Point Likert Scale format (Strongly Agree---Undecided----Strongly Disagree) focusing on issues with clients and threatening behavior related to referrals, case management, disclosure of PHI, etc. Key shifts from Pre-Training to Post-training were noted on the following items from (Disagree, Undecided, Agree to **Strongly Agree)** with *Pre-Post Strongly Agree*
Percentages listed below (see Appendix 9):

- **I** *believe that a community-based threat assessment and management system is necessary to prevent acts of targeted violence*
    - Pre-Test=48.72% and Post-Test= 66.67%
- *Community and school-based mental health professionals have an important role in both threat assessment and threat management*
    - Pre-Test=57.89% and Post-Test=90.48%

- *I believe knowledge of threat assessment would be useful in my therapeutic work with clients who are aggressive and potentially violent*
    - Pre-Test=55.26% and Post-Test=72.7%

- *I believe the use of disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of a person or the public, provisions in HIPAA permits the disclosure, in good faith*.
    - Pre-Test=39.47% and **Post-Test=75%**

The changes in the professional opinions are complementary to the increase on the Knowledge Test scores of threat assessment principles. The opinion data lends itself useful to posit how the professionals in this training

may apply their knowledge in a clinical setting. The most critical opinion items changed was the last listed above. Disclosure of PHI may be necessary at times and in California, licensed mental health professionals have an obligation to report threats that their clients may make towards others. This data reiterates the importance of BTAM training that is customized for the typical mental health professional who practices in the community as opposed to training designed to train mental health professionals to be forensic specialists.

Training Evaluation and Feedback
In conversations held with the participants and through analysis of the feedback section of the evaluation forms, the overwhelming consensus was that the training was effective the participants yearly retention of the training would be useful. Dr. Holifield and Dr. Tau had attempted to fit a significant amount of content into the three -hour period, which drew appreciation from the participants, but proved difficult in the limited time span.

Below are additional statistics specifically from the participant evaluation section of the post-test:
1. Instruction: The program objectives were met
    a. 83.3% of participants responded "Agree" or "strongly agree" when asked if they training satisfied the objective of "Identifying three domains of behaviors in the Threat Assessment for Targeted Violence Framework"
    b. 83.3% of participants responded "Agree" or "strongly agree" when asked if they training satisfied the objective "List the six stages of the Pathway to Violence"
    c. 91.6% of participants responded "Agree" or "strongly agree" when asked if they training satisfied the objective of "identify when to refer to a threat assessment professional"

Successes and Key Highlight:
A lasting impact from the Mental Health Providers Training is the 15 participants that stated they would be interested in joining a community network of licensed professionals dedicated to threat assessment identification, triage, and treatment. Thus 30% of the participants following this training indicated a desire to be a part of a Mental Health Provider network in the community designed to support school threat assessment teams, as well as students of concern who have been assessed by Level 1 Teams, with potential mental health services. This finding of the project is deemed to be a crucial component of an effective threat assessment network and B-HARP highly recommends this strategy to any communities employing similar methods.

Education of Students on Warning Signs (B-SAVE)
Student Video Assignment-Public Service Announcement

One key objective of the original B-HARP grant proposal centered on educating students on behavioral warning signs associated with student threats. Originally in 2019 it was thought that that a member from a school district's threat assessment team would co-present with a community expert to students within their district. However, as COVID-19 continued this idea was scratched. Although not in the original proposal, the project that fulfilled this section of the grant was the creation of a Student Video educating students on the warning signs of severe acts of targeted violence, how to report signs, and what happens once a concern has been reported. From the start, the phrase "by students, for students" was utilized as a goal for the project. According to the United States Secret Service, students report concerning behaviors at half the rate of adults. The phrase "see something, say something" is often used, even in prominent media such as Sandy Hook Promise, but B-HARP's concern was that students often do not know what they are supposed to see, and who they should report too.

On November 9th, 2021, B-HARP contact the Communications and Media (CAM) Team at the San Luis Obispo Office of Education. Email contacts were provided to several school district teachers about the project. Only one school district responded. Through a connection with the Communications and Media (CAM) Team at the San Luis Obispo Office of Education B-HARP facilitated a meeting with Jason Heimerdinger, the video

production teacher at San Luis Obispo High School on April 26th, 2022 and pitched the idea of the student video. The video was to serve as the final project for the SLO High video productions class, where groups of students would work with B-HARP as a "client" to produce a 90-120 second PSA educating students on what signs to look for, who to report to, how to report, and why student often do not report.

Dr. Holifield and Owen Lemm presented to the class of 22 students on May 18th. They educated the class on B-HARP goals and activities, introduced the assignment, and provided comparable video projects, which the students analyzed for strength and weaknesses.

The students had two weeks to work on the project, with an opportunity to submit their drafts for feedback halfway through the process. The final projects were submitted June 8th. The videos were reviewed and graded for creativity, execution, and content by Dr. Holifield and Owen Lemm. Mr. Heimerdinger graded on aspects of video production. The rubric can be found in Appendix 8. There were 10 videos submitted, with gift card prizes awarded to the top three videos. To maintain confidentiality through FERPA, an Adobe Sign form was submitted to students and their parents to either not allow B-HARP to use their student video or grant permission for video use by B-HARP. Several students and their parents provided permission over the summer of 2022.

Community Violence Prevention Workshop (Adult Training)
In feedback from training surveys and MHSA stakeholder meetings, one question repeatedly arose: *When will we be focusing on adult threats and threat assessment training?*

The answer to that question was a 2-day workshop conducted by Lt. Dave Okada, Dr. Holifield and Dr. Manny Tau. The first day consisted of a plenary session, which was held in the morning to maximize attendance for community professionals who could not attend a full two-day session. After a presentation on B-HARP and its goals, Dr. Holifield led a Question-and-Answer discussion period where he facilitated conversation of threat assessment topics from the two experts. In the second half of day one and the entirety of day two, Dr. Tau and Lt. Okada talked through case studies and led the group through deeper dives in behavioral threat assessment concepts and applications in the community.

Knowledge Section:
Of the 21 participants who attended the adult community violence prevention trainings, 19 completed the knowledge component pre-test, 15 completed it on the posttest, and 11 were matched completing both. The Community Violence Prevention Survey Pre-Post measure had a total of 14 questions with outcome data presented with Percent Correct in the table below:

Table 10: Percent Knowledge Increase for Aggregate for Adult Training

Community Violence Prevention Survey	Pre Percent Correct	N	Post Percent Correct	N	Percent Increase
Aggregate (Groups)	67.44%	19	77.03%	15	**14.21**
Matched	58.42%	11	85.07%	11	**45.61**

In looking at the Matched Pre-Post data there was an increase that was over 30% as opposed to the Aggregate Groups. This difference may be explained in the participants who did not complete the Post-Test on Day 2. It may be that their Pre-Test scores were high and skewed the Aggregate Group data. For the Matched Group, a statistical analysis using a Paired T-Test with a p-value < .05 for statistically significant difference, found a t (10) = -3.91, d= .42. p=.003 demonstrating the strength of the increase.

Attitudes Section:
The Attitudes section of the assessment comprised of an 8-item scale using a 5-Point Likert Scale Ranging (Strongly Disagree---Undecided--- Strongly Agree). The findings saw increases in all areas to Agree and Strongly Agree. The key attitude shifts occurred in the following areas:

- *I know what to look for regarding concerning behaviors at my place of employment (*
  - *(20% Increase)*
- *I feel comfortable reporting a concerning behavior to a supervisor at my place of employment*
  - (19% increase)
- *Annual staff trainings on behaviors of concern or warning signs are necessary*
  - (31% increase)

Key Success and Highlights:
Partnering with the San Luis Obispo Chamber of Commerce allowed for beneficial community networking beyond that of district-based trainings. The diverse grouping of participants included local business owners, school district staff, staff from local mental health facilities, law enforcement officers, and the SLO District Attorney, serving as an effective foundation for an Adult Community Threat Assessment Network.

The San Luis Obispo District Attorney attended the Adult Community Training in May, with he and his office coming away from the event both interested in and committed to the B-HARP Project. The Assistant District Attorney had attended B-HARP Partner Meeting. This initial interest led to Dr. Holifield of the B-HARP project and the San Luis Obispo County's District Attorney's Office moving forward and applying for a federal funding to support county activities related to K-12 threat assessment beyond the MHSA INNovation Grant of June 2023.

The District Attorney's Office, with community letters from the San Luis Obispo County Office of Education and the Director of SLOBHS, applied for and was awarded a 3-year Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice-Administration STOP School Violence Grant in October of 2022 and began grant activities in March of 2023.

B-HARP requested input and feedback for this training. Below are listed the responses received:

"Remarkable training. It has helped me to better understand threat management and how to handle potential threats in the workplace."

"Presenters were extremely knowledgeable and the topic was very relevant"

"Very well organized and managed event with engaging experts. This will generate discussion within my agency."

SECTION 5:

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

AND

INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION

Community Engagement and Interagency Collaboration
Memorandums of Understanding MOU's
During the proposal period of the grant, there was a training idea that focuses on the legal issues surrounding threat assessment and compliance with regulations among all community partners prior to the implementation of training. Originally, this organization operated from an MOU that was templated based upon the Salem-Keizer Cascade Model provided by the Community Expert. This was reviewed at the Community Partner's Meeting in December of 2020 (see Appendix 6). An original unsigned example of this MOU was provided to SLOBHS MHSA in the FY 2020-21 Annual Report.

In FY 21-22, this templated MOU was rewritten and sent for feedback to the community partners participating in the grant. No major changes were suggested. This was the anticipated implementation year, yet the Omicron variant of COVID-19 impacted school and agencies. The issue of onboarding a Level 2 Sco Meetings. With the revised Level 2 Protocol which will be incorporated into the FY 22-23 MOUs with school districts.

During the FY 21-22 review, the Level 2 meeting shifted to discussion and consultation of actual student behaviors and cases from community partners. Given that the Level 2 protocol stemming from the Salem-Keiser/Cascade Model from the Community Expert and our Level 2 Team was trained by the Clinical Expert (threat assessment skills) for the last 2 years, a by-product of this cross-hybridization was the creation of a Level 2 protocol incorporating language from both approaches. The year had been challenging a lot of information to consider for the Level 2 Student Threat Consultation Incident Protocol. The goal for the end of the year on the revision of the Level 1 Threat Assessment and developing the Level 2 Student Threat Consultation Team Meeting procedures.

For FY 22-23, Dr. Holifield revised the MOU to reflect the new Piloted Level 2 Process as well as expectations for community partner attendance at B-HARP trainings. At Community Partner Meetings and Level 2 Threat Advisory Meeting (Level 2 Threat Consultation Meetings) from May 2022 to September of 2022, community partners were presented with piloted procedures of the Level 2 process related to confidentiality, presentation of cases, how student cases would be shared, etc. MOUs were sent and many were returned and signed with only one district wanting a small language change. None of the community partners had major questions or concerns about the Level 2 Process. In Appendices 5 and 6, there are examples of both the confidentiality agreement for meetings as well as a sample Level 2 Threat Consultation Team Meeting (Threat Advisory Meeting) Agenda.

OUTCOMES COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND INTERAGENCY COLLABORATION
Informational Presentations to Districts, School Boards, Community Agencies
One way to measure community engagement outside of training attendance and interagency meetings, is to examine the interest in the project through community presentations. We labeled and defined these as Informational Presentations to the San Luis Obispo Community about the B-HARP grant goals and activities. The Total Informational B-HARP Presentations to the San Luis Obispo County Community was defined as *"any formal requested and scheduled presentation made to an agency, school district, or public about B-HARP and nature of grant project."*

Table 11: Number of B-HARP Informational Presentations by Fiscal Year

	FY 2019-2020	FY 2020-21	FY 2021-22	FY 22-23*	Percent Increase*
Total Informational B-HARP Presentations	3	7	20	5	66.67%

*Tabulation ended March 1, 2023

Attendance at a Level-2 Training

Another way to measure community engagement is to measure the number of community experts sent to Level 2 trainings to be trained to participate in the Level 2 Threat Advisory (Threat Consultation Team) Meetings. This was measured by the following:

Total Level 2 Experts=Total Number of Experts Attending a Level 2 Training by year (Unduplicated and Duplicated)-Community Experts. This represents combined training attendance among all Silos.

For FY 2019-2020, only Dr. Holifield (n=1) had been previously trained by the Clinical Expert as well as attended a brief introductory training for the Salem-Keizer Cascade Model by the Community Expert.

Table 12: Level 2 Training Attendance: Duplicated Attendance

	FY 2019-2020	FY 2020-21	FY 2021-22	FY* 22-23	Percent Increase*
Level 2 Community Experts Trained	1	12	14	14	1300%

*Tabulation ended March 1, 2023

From the beginning of the B-HARP grant there was a 1300% increase in Level 2 Community Experts trained in the San Luis Obispo Community. From 2020 to 2023 the Silo breakdown of the total number of Level 2 Community Experts who have received advanced threat assessment training and the number of experts participating in B-HARP activities are listed below:

EI Silo: 13 Level 2 Experts Trained (7 Expert Participating in Level 2 Meeting-FY 22-23
MH Silo: 8 Level 2 Experts Trained (6 Experts Participating in Level 2 Meetings-FY 22-23
LE Silo: 4 Level 2 Experts Training (2 Expert Participating in Level 2 Meetings-FY 22-23)
Total: 25 Trained and 15 Active

The goal was 15-20 community experts trained within the grant period. Our current data shows that a total of 25 persons in the community were trained since the start of the Level 2 Training in 2020. Only 15 remained active in the Level 2 Threat Consultation Meetings. Several of these professionals moved to other positions within the County or left to take positions in other communities outside of San Luis Obispo County. It should be note that at the end-of-the grant there were 4 professionals attending Level 2 Meetings who had not been trained in advanced threat assessment principles, but were representing districts and agencies as potential resources.

Interagency Collaboration-Community Partner and Level 2 Threat Consultation Team

The original proposal noted that there would be thirty percent (30%) increase of interagency collaboration through the development and use of the coordinated and collaborative training system and model for threat assessment. Measurement and metrics to analyzed this approach was originally conceptualized as the number of Level 2 Cases completed by Level 2 Team Members. However, when the COVID-19 Pandemic emerged and continued throughout most of the grant process impacting onboarding of the Level 2 process, different metrics were established. The focus became on measuring attendance at the established meetings in the grant

that, by design, required interagency collaboration and the development of the Level 2 Community Process. The metrics are defined below:

1. *Total Level 2 Consultation Meetings Attendance*
   The Number of Repeated Attendance Contacts from each Silo Over Each Year of the Grant
2. *Total Community Partner Members Attendance by Year=*
   Number of Repeated Attendance for each Community Partner Meeting
3. *Combined Interagency Collaboration=*
   The Total Attendance of both Interagency Meetings for the Fiscal Year.

Attendance would be total, duplicated attendance among all Silos (Educational Institutions, Law Enforcement, and Mental Health). Prior to FY 2021-22, attendance was measured in grant logs, tabulated meeting attendance in-person, as well as email confirmation and Zoom attendance matched with Zoom Attendance sheets. From FY 2021-22 to the final year, the Zoom Platform provided an application to tabulate meeting attendance after immediately retrospectively for up to 12 months. This method was mostly utilized. This information is represented in Table 13 below:

Table 13: Percent Increase of Interagency Collaboration

Interagency Activity	FY 2019-20	FY 2020-21	FY 2021-22	FY * 2022-23	Percent Increase
Level 2 Team Threat Consultation Meeting Attendance (formerly Threat Advisory)	0	42	85	91	116.67%
Community Partner Meeting Attendance	32	24	80	77	140.63%
Combined Interagency Collaboration	32	66	165	168	425%

* *Attendance data were tabulated only to March 1, 2023 (end of the grant activities).*

The Level 2 Meetings did not begin until January of 2021. Since there were no cases due to COVID-19, further training in threat assessment concepts and case reviews were extended for 6 months. It was not until January of 2022 that some schools and agencies were sending direct referrals to the B-HARP Level 2 Threat Assessment Team. Some of these were bypassing a Level 1 assessment as word spread to the community about a potential "community threat assessment team." Although mentioned in the Level 1 and Level 2 Trainings, the process had to be refined to discuss concerns from Level 1 School Teams with reiterate the understanding that the schools had to use the Level 1 Protocol prior to a referral to a Level 1 Consultation. Attendance increased during this time and reflected input from multiple partners on further refining a process for meetings. By the end of the grant, with a more formalized process in place, attendance had increased even though data only reflected 75% of the academic year as grant tabulation ended March 1, 2023.

The Community Partner Meeting concept began to emerge during the FY 2018-19 proposal year with several preliminary informational meetings with each of the Silos (13 meetings with Mental Health Silo, 6 meetings with Education Institution Silo; and 0 Meetings with Law Enforcement). Meeting attendance with the Law Enforcement Silo began through the first Community Partner's Meeting in August of 2019 and increased during the FY 2020-21 and FY 21-22 years following several B-HARP Informational Presentations. Community Partner meetings also moved from monthly meetings to every other month during FY 2022-23.

A review of the table above shows that a significant increase in Interagency Collaboration from the beginning of the B-HARP grant until the end for all three Interagency Collaboration measures.

Community Use of a Single Threat Assessment Protocol

For FY 21-22 attempts were made to obtain more detailed information from school districts as outlined in the original proposal. After several survey attempts with minimal success, feedback from districts indicated that they were unable to complete a detail survey due to low staff and time constraints. In June 2022, B-HARP distributed a survey to the Level 2 Threat Consultation Team Members that was designed to capture data regarding threat assessment cases and reports that had been conducted in the county. Data was collected from designated Level 2 members representing the districts. For districts that attended the training, but had not yet adopted the Level 1 Protocol and attended Community Partner Meetings, the survey was provided as well. The data for the FY 2021-22 and FY 2023 school year are reflected in Table 14 below:

TABLE 14: Level 1 School District Threat Assessment Reporting and B-HARP Community Process

School District Threat Assessment Process Reporting*	FY 21-22	FY 22-23#
School Districts that Received Level 1 Training	6	7
School Districts Using Level 1 Piloted Protocol and Level 2 Process	5	5
Total Threat Assessments Completed-All B-HARP Trained Districts	29**	114***
B-HARP Professional Discussions	19	80
B-HARP Level 1-Protocol Threat Assessments Conducted	29	42
B-HARP Level 2-Threat Consultation Team Meeting Consultations	5	12
School District Threat Assessment Reporting by Grade Level	**FY 21-22***	**FY 22-23#**
Elementary School	8	45
Middle School	2	24
High School	2	20

*See Appendix 1: B-HARP Community Process

#-Note: For similar comparison periods, these numbers were from Aug 22-June 23 which was beyond measurement period for grant

**Note: School Districts only reported total number of threat assessments, and did not provide information about other areas in their survey.

***Two school districts had teams attend Level 1 Training but had not adopted Level 1 Protocol for use

Throughout the 2021-2022 Fiscal Year, B-HARP tracked threat assessment reports and use of protocols from partner districts as well as sending a retrospective survey for each partner district to complete. Many threat assessments were not being conducted in the Fall of 2021 and then the mass school shooting at Oxford High School in Michigan led to an increase in threats reported by local school districts in December of 2021.

After cross-referencing the independently tracked cases and the survey cases, it was determined that a total of 29 Level 1 Threat Assessments were reported to B-HARP this school year. However, districts did not report that many Professional Discussions as several districts noted that the team want to use any opportunity to use the Level 1 Protocol to gain familiarity with the procedures in response to threats. The Level 2 Threat Consultation Process started to onboard in January of 2022 and rather quickly, there were five district inquiries about the Level 2 Consultation Team's ability to conduct a more detailed threat assessment. However, the Level 2 process and protocol at that time had not been fully designed. Of all threat assessments completed, 66% of the threat assessments were at the elementary level.

For FY 22-23, there was an increase in reporting of data by districts after receiving further coaching in the Level 1 Training in the Spring of 2022 and at District Protocol Trainings. Level 2 Members from School District also took on additional responsibility in managing and reporting the data. Two districts had received Level 1 Training but had not adopted the Level 1 Protocol for use by their school teams. One of these districts only reported Total Number of Threat Assessments and nothing else, while the other district reported

Total Number of Threat Assessments and provided additional information about the grade-levels of these threat assessments.

For those districts using the Level 1 and Level 2 Process, roughly 52% of threats responded to by the school districts that had a Professional Discussion led to a Level 1 Threat Assessment being conducted. Twenty-eight percent (28%) of the Level 1 threat assessment found enough concerns to warrant a consultation to the Level 2 Consultation Team. It should be noted that for all threats responded to by school teams in the Professional Discussion Phase, 15% of the threats responded to and investigated by the school Level 1 threat assessment teams identified concerning behaviors and/or risk factors to request a consultation with the Level 2 Team.

Interagency Implementation and Level 2 Pilot Cases

The original goal for the B-HARP project was to have the community experts begin conducting threat assessment post Level 2 training. In the 2018-2019 proposal, it was envisioned that the B-HARP Team would present actual cases to the Clinical Expert and then provide expert feedback and suggestions. In FY 2020-21, due to COVID-19 restrictions and schools having online learning, the focus of the educational partners was student health related concerns and not school violence. None of the partners reported incidents of school threats during this period.

Level 2 Team Meetings: Threat Consultation Cases:

In the original 2018-2019 MHSA proposal, one school district provided a historical range of the number of threat assessments the district deemed high level which required multiple agencies. The district indicated that the range from the review of previous years showed about 9-12 student threat assessment cases per year that were deemed high level of concern, with 2-4 cases per year of those cases requiring multi-agency responses, and 2-3 student threat assessment cases per year requiring psychiatric hospitalization. When it came to communication among agencies and school districts, what was not available at the time, was a structure and process in the community to discuss, consult, and leverage community resources in a manner that would expedite communication and collaboration. The Level 2 Threat Consultation Team Meetings were designed to test this structure and process.

The case examples below were picked to reflect the complexity of issues the Level 1 school teams encountered. For reasons of student confidentiality only key aspects of each case and the outcomes will be discussed. Mainly these cases are provided to show the increased collaborative efforts piloted from the goals and via grant funding. It also impresses the importance of a representative an interagency body of local consultants to leverage community resources. The information below is intended to highlight the issues that were presented during piloting of the B-HARP Process and Level 2 Threat Consultative Protocol.

Case 1 - High School Student-Warning Signs in a Therapy Session (FY 2021-22)
One evening, Dr. Holifield received a call from one of the Level 2 Team Members who supervises mental health therapists at a local mental health agency (Level 2 Mental Health Team Member). According to the Level 2 Team Member, the therapist reported to her that her client, an adolescent, discussed in a therapy session that she was concerned about her friend becoming a school shooter. It is noteworthy that the therapist had previously attended Dr. Holifield and Dr. Tau's *Triaging Dangerous Behaviors in Therapy Workshop* in October of 2021 which was part of Goal 4, the Mental Health Providers Training. The therapist remembered some key components of concerning behaviors and warning signs from the workshop and referenced the workshop handouts. She asked her client further questions about the client's boyfriend's behavior and became concerned. Specifically, her client's friend talked about school shootings in general and the Oxford High School Shooting in Michigan. The therapist reported the client's concern was that her friend was showing an increasing frustration with peers and teachers at school that was mixed into the couple's discussions.

The Level 2 Mental Health Youth Team Member and Dr. Holifield triaged the case, located the school district of the client's friend, and contacted the school resource officer for that high school, who was also a Level 2 Law Enforcement Team Member. The resource officer then contacted the high school administrator that evening to schedule a Level 1 school threat assessment for the following morning. The conclusion from the threat assessment was that there were emotional and behavioral concerns, but no planning or research to attack the school. Law enforcement visited the student's home, interviewed the parents about weapons access which there were none. This student was referred for mental health therapy.

This case example demonstrates the effectiveness of a community team approach by being able to contact the key team members, share important information, triage a case, and develop a measured response. This also highlights the effectiveness of Goal 4 and the main purpose of this grant, to educate mental health professionals on behavioral warning signs associated with Increasing Knowledge of Intervention Approaches Among Providers and Provider Capacity.

Case 2-Student Threat Incident Pilot Protocol- Beta Test-(FY 2022-23)
Only one case was used to Level 2 Threat Consultation Pilot Protocol which was designed for a multi-team inquiry to further assist a Level 1 School/District Team. The case that was piloted was with a student with a history of having been involved in several threat assessments since early elementary at several different schools. There had been multiple MHET contacts since early elementary and several of those in within the past year. The student was receiving a significant amount of school-based behavioral and school-based mental health services. The student was also involved with a local mental health agency.

The incident of concern occurred after a long day of agitation by the student and ended with the student showing aggression towards staff which resulted in a call to MHET and local police. In anger, the student verbalized a desire to be the next school shooter. There were comments about wanting to shoot up a community event. Drawings discovered in folded paper on the desk with concerning images and references related to several risk factors and warning behaviors associated with targeted violence. The Level 1 Threat Assessment Team conducted a thorough threat inquiry that involved MHET, local police, school staff, the student's therapist, and the parents. There were no indications of availability of guns or explosives.

Several members of the Level 2 School Threat Consultation Team with the pilot protocol reviewed available information from the school, law enforcement, and from a mental health agency and met with the school team to obtain more detailed information. In looking at previous threat assessments and the incident of concern, the student showed no preparatory behaviors, research and planning, probing, and breaches associated with a pathway to targeted violence. Based upon the available information, it did not appear that the student was making efforts to obtain weapons or mentioning specific dates or places associated with his verbalized threat. However, the student continued to show ongoing emotional and behavioral dysregulation. The student had shown fixations with school shooters, World War 2, military weapons, and the Holocaust.

A debriefing of the Level 2 Team's findings was provided to both the school team and the local mental health agency with recommendations to supplement the school's current safety plan and interventions. The school team and mental health agency were provided a handout that could be shared with everyone on ways to monitor concerning behaviors. The school team then held an IEP meeting with the parents which included a review of a revised behavioral support plan from a behavioral assessment they had been conducting. Intervention approaches were adjusted by the school. There were some concerns about attendance and access to services for some time. Several updates were provided by the district's Level 2 representative at the Level 2 Threat Consultation Meetings showing that the student attending school-based support on a consistent basis toward the end of the school year.

<u>Additional Cases FY 2021-22 -FY 22-23-Description and Outcomes</u>

Elementary School Student- A threat assessment conducted after a student bystander informed a teacher about a female student who had recruited another student to" kidnap and kill a girl" whom she did not like because that was "too happy." The female student had been asking a few other students to assist her. The MHET and local police went to the home. Rope and tape were found at home that were to be used. A district trained threat assessment team in collaboration with law enforcement completed a threat assessment. There were significant concerning factors related to the student's trauma history, sense of abandonment, and several preparatory actions associated with a loose plan for kidnapping the student. The MHET Team evaluated the student, she was hospitalized, and then received outpatient mental health therapy upon return. Level 2 Threat Assessment Consultation Team Members were consulted by the school district about a school safety plan as well as with the mental health agency treatment team regarding intervention approaches.

Elementary School Student- A Level 1 threat assessment was conducted by the school team after a young elementary school student made continued verbal remarks about shooting his teacher and the principal. The student interview revealed additional thoughts about shooting a former preschool. Guns were accessible at home, but in a locked safe. A threat assessment was completed by the school team, which included a school resource officer, A debriefing with the parents by the school threat assessment team prompted the parents to move the guns to a relative's home out-of-county. The parents also expressed a desire for their child to receive mental health therapy and inquired about local resources.

Middle School Student- On a class assignment, a student wrote content wanting to "kill all students and find out how to make a bomb and hide it." The student had previously made suicidal statements earlier in the school year that required county mobile crisis MHET (Mental Health Evaluation Team). MHET was called to the school and parents were notified. A member of the responding MHET had been trained in both Level 1 and Level 2 threat assessment principles and was concerned by the student's suicidal and homicidal ideation. The student reiterated an intent to kill students. The school team and Level 2 School District Representatives began a Level 1 Threat Assessment. After interviewing several students, it was discovered that the student of concern had made a slide show with gruesome cartoon figures and content related to murder. There were veiled threats made in the slide show and a mention of weapons.

The school did not have an assigned school resource officer. An officer with a local police agency met with the MHET team at the student's home. After meeting with a parent and searching the home with parent's permission, a box labeled "weapons box" with various hatchets, picks, and knives. Several unsecured guns were observed in the home. The student was placed on a 5585, 72-hour hold outside San Luis Obispo County. Although the Level 1 Threat Assessment had not been completed the school district requested a Level 2 Threat Consultation at the Level 2 Team Meeting the following day.

The Level 1 School Team had concerns about the weapons in the home as the law enforcement officer indicated that the officer could not legally acquire the weapons from the home. There were also concerns about several family risk factors. In response to the concern, a Level 2 Law Enforcement Team member assisted the school district by making a call to the police department and discussing the issue with the Chief of Police at that agency. Following this call, the police department assisted the family in voluntarily securing the guns and the weapons at the police station. The family was encouraged to seek private mental health support in the community and the student was evaluated for special education services by the school upon return from hospitalization. The student was found eligible for services and additional mental health supports were provided. An additional aide was provided at school work with the student to assist with the safety plan and monitoring.

High School Student-Following Robb Elementary School Shooting in Uvalde, TX, San Luis Obispo County schools experienced a significant uptick in reported threats. One local threat was made by a high school student on social media posing with a gun and making a threatening statement. This was reported by students.

A Level 1 Threat Assessment was conducted and the team found concern several concerning issues, with the most significant being that student did have access to a weapon (the one shown on social media). Law enforcement became involved and the student was arrested. A criminal investigation ensued with no further information provided beyond this point to the grant project.

High School Student-A school district initially responded to a social media discussion by students about an alleged sexual assault by a male high school. The initial school investigation and law enforcement investigation found no evidence of an assault but uncovered a pattern of behavior more indicative of stalking and harassment. During this time, a threat was reported by other students that the student of concern made an online threat to harm a student and the student's pet. The school team with the SRO conducted a Level 1 Threat Assessment. Several families of students also filed a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the student of concern and refused to allow their children on campus until this situation was resolved.

The Level 1 School Threat Assessment Team discovered a pattern of behavior by the student of concern centered on stalking behaviors of others related to "perceived rejection" by other students in general and more intensely and specifically, perceived love interests. The school team reviewed multiple sources of information and uncovered additional behavioral and social risk factors. Emotionally there were concerns with social misperception, anger, and hopelessness. Additional assessment by the school found that student of concern had a fixation on Russian military, acquired a gas mask, and made jokes about the Holocaust. The student also sketched violent drawings and showed other students. There was no access to guns at home. The student had been receiving special education support prior to the threat assessment. The Level 1 School Team noted that there was tension at an IEP meeting between the student of concern's parents and the student's private therapist with the school team as the student was temporarily removed from school.

After a Level 2 Team Consultation, the district Level 1 School Threat Assessment Team was provided with suggestions on school-based approaches for additional special education supports, options for collaboration with the family and private therapist, links for further community resources for all families, and a contact for an agency that provided mediation. The student reportedly had to abide by the restraining order and an additional special educational aide was provided to assist with the school monitoring plan. Several updates provided by the Level 1 School Threat Assessment Team, mentioned that a mediation meeting had occurred between school district and multiple parties, all students involved (student of concern and students feeling targeted) came back to school, and the student of concern responded positively to school-based interventions. At school meetings and check-ins, the school team reported increased cooperation among the student of concern's family members and therapist with the school team.

SECTION 6:

MHSA INNovation QUESTIONS ANSWERED

AND

B-HARP PROJECT DISCUSSION

B-HARP: Revisiting Proposal and MHSA Project Questions

In reflecting on the goals and outcomes of the B-HARP grant and presenting problem, in FY 2018-19, San Luis Obispo County lacked a coordinated and collaborative training model and system to assess and intervene as necessary with school-based threats. Moreover, none of the educational, law enforcement or educational institutions had a regular data base that monitors the number of threats made, whether low level or of higher level, type of threat, and by whom, that warrants a multi-agency response.

The B-HARP project was designed to develop and test a coordinated and collaborative training model and system to learn, assess, and intervene when cases of threats become apparent or imminent. The innovation project was also proposed to create a new learning and language model between the mental health system (MHS), law enforcement (LE), and educational institutions employing a new curriculum derived from proven and effective models, but tailored to San Luis Obispo and directed to the coordinating efforts between MHS, LE, educational institutions (EI). The innovation project was meant to educate and decrease the criminalization and stigmatization of youth in cases of threats.

In this section, we will examine the questions posited at the beginning of the document with the outcomes presented in the ensuring sections. However, first it is important to discuss the results in relation to the challenges and impact brought about by the COVID-19 Pandemic on this project. The gains made in this project were the result of many individuals from partner districts and agencies who believed in the purpose of the project and dedicated time, support, resources, and encouragement to ensure accomplishment of various grant activities. Several of these individuals were with the project from its inception and assisted with the proposal, meeting organization, and recruitment of trainees.

Impacts of COVID-19 Pandemic-FY 2019-20 to FY 21-22
Through the course of the grant period, COVID-19 affected the ability of the B-HARP project to fully test the model at a school system for our K-12 partners. Students and school staff slowly returned to in-person classrooms over the course of 14-months, yet B-HARP meetings took place virtually. At the beginning of testing the training approach in 2020, this required a steep learning curve when having to pivot from training models that were designed for in-person, 2-day events with team break-out sessions, to 1-day or 2 half-day virtual sessions where participant video screens were often turned-off. District and community partner focus and commitment waxed and waned during this period, especially as the Omicron variant forced schools to close. With students at home, threats at school were not reported by participating school partners. With no students at school and no school threats reported, there no threat assessments being conducted by the participating schools in FY 2020-21 and in the Fall of FY 2021-22. This delayed the development and full implementation of the Level 2 Community Consultation Team and its procedures for about 20 months.

For all community partners, the issue of staff turnover in positions was prevalent in FY 2021-22 and shortages in staff recruitment in FY 22-23. During typical times, in the area of threat assessment, staff turnover in key positions is an ongoing dilemma for K-12 threat assessment teams to address. In fact, the rationale for repeated, annual training proposed in this grant was meant to confront this system issue. Staffing issues and educational/agency strain impacted grant participation during the October 2021 Level 1 and Level 2 Training events as these were the lowest attended during the grant. Even with a letter of support and strong initial interest and participation from our local higher education institution (Cal Poly-San Luis Obispo), the participating members from the university had to withdrawing from the project to address ongoing student issues related to COVID-19.

With the pandemic continuing and school districts/agencies grappling with in-person school and services, B-HARP participation began to wane in October and November of 2021. The B-HARP project was at a critical juncture of attaining the project's intended goals and outcomes set prior to the pandemic. Unfortunately, it

took a national school shooting tragedy the week after Thanksgiving of that year (Oxford High School Shooting in Michigan), followed by an influx of threats to local schools (Contagion Effect) for the community to re-engage with B-HARP and recognize the need for threat assessment training and support. With another school shooting occurring in late May of 2022 in Uvalde, TX, training requests increased by school districts, and participation in B-HARP grant activities begin in Spring of 2022 and continued through the end of the grant implementation period to March, 1 2023.

Education and Training in BTAM Principles and Warnings Signs
Despite the impacts of the COVID-19 Pandemic, the B-HARP project achieved and exceeded the training goals for the community. There were 17 Clinical Training Sessions (See Table 1) which included 4 trainings that expanded to the community and were considered Community Trainings. For community-based trainings and presentations, B-HARP provided access to 2 presentations by previous MHSA INNovation Grantees implementing threat assessment models, 4 Expansion Trainings, and 2 presentations/training on the Salem-Keizer Cascade Model for the community partners and Level 2 Team. The only official training that did not occur during the period was the Legal Consultation Training.

B-HARP met the training obligations of training (75-100) unduplicated participants. The total number of unduplicated training participants for the project was 348 and Table 3 shows that for each fiscal year, this was met and was exceeded for FY 21-22 and FY 22-23. A threshold of a 30% increase in the level of knowledge and skill to identify and prevent school and community threats was established at the beginning of the grant. This threshold was not met for the larger Level 1 Training events, yet there was a statistically-significant increase beyond chance using a T-Test analysis. The MHP Training showed participant knowledge increase at 23%. The other trainings did exceed the 30% increase in knowledge. As far as skill to identify threats and application, the participants in the Level 2 Case Reviews with the Clinical Expert, as a group, increased their application skills over 100%.

One area that was added to the Knowledge measurement was that of Attitudes and Opinions about school violence, the professional's role in violence prevention and threat assessment, and the participant's confidence in carrying out the knowledge that was learned at the training. This data provided a unique opportunity to examine to measure a training's ability to alter preconceived attitudes and opinions that changed due to the presentation and workshop. More importantly changes and attitudes and opinions can influence changes in behaviors. The attitudes of other trainees from the Level 1, Teacher, and Adult Trainings, showed that participants significantly changed their attitudes or view about their roles in threat assessment, improved their confidence in reporting concerning behaviors, and increased their confidence in their ability to manage and organize threat assessment teams.

A primary example of changing professional opinions came from the MHP training. The Pre-Test Attitude data showed that mental health professionals were more likely to disclose information that they perceived as threatening to others. This finding is critical in that it lends hope that mental health professionals, once understanding the warning signs and threat assessment process, may more fully understand their obligation to disclose information should their client make threatening verbalizations or gestures towards others. This type of training and target audience could be the beginning of a crucial tool that would establish professionals in the Mental Health Silo as community professionals willing to address behaviors and actions of threats to others made by their clients.

The two other opinion shifts were that mental health professionals believe that threat assessment would be useful in their therapeutic work with clients who are aggressive and potentially violent and they believe they have an important role in BTAM. This makes sense from a community practitioner's perspective. More likely than not, therapists may have or have had a client whom initially came in with a major life stressor, have a grievance/complaint, or may be experiencing emotional distress. A MHP training such as the one conducted in the grant would be very useful to educate therapists to further delve into issues if clients begin to

show concerning behaviors. Therapists would be able to adjust their treatment and case management approach more effectively by working with school teams, parents, and other agencies who may have evaluated their client through a Level 1 Threat Assessment or received a Level 2 Consultation.

In reviewing what the best approaches for teaching and training the participants in the among the Silos, the B-HARP project provided some ideas for future trainings. Although the trainings were forced into providing virtual training due to COVID-19, there were some favorable data in 2020 to show that such a training, if planned properly, can be done and information learned. However, the best training approach for a Level 1 Training was shown to be in the last training in February 2023, a 2-day, In-Person Training with an opportunity for teams to collaborate at tables and breakout into case reviews. This may not be the best application for all trainings or even for those who have previously attended more than one Level 1 training. Rather, professionals who have attended two previous In-Person Trainings may likely benefit with a refresher, online learning module in an asynchronous format with a printed certificate of completion.

For teacher trainings, the idea of an In-Person staff training seemed to be beneficial in that it allowed for teacher questions and time to meet the Level 1 Team. The Student Video Project (B-SAVE) was an alternative project that demonstrated student investment into developing and providing educational information about school violence prevention. The PSA format and requirements allowed students to deliver their content in a creative manner. Unfortunately, these videos were not shown to the larger school population or tested beyond the classroom setting. The are available for MHSAOAC review or with local partner districts in San Luis Obispo County as a demonstration project. Finally, the Level 2 Case Reviews with the Clinical Expert was an innovative approach to skill application to simulated, complex threat assessment cases. Measuring knowledge through a multiple-choice test or attitudes via Likert-Scale only provides a measure of learning, case reviews allow for participants to apply their knowledge. The expert ratings and feedback could be prospective to measure team growth over time and could be a useful approach for team learning and application at future training events.

The final questions that were originally posed for training and education were about the best methods to increase prevention and early detection and engagement as it relates to threat assessment. This question is difficult to answer given the that we did not have much time to spend on educating bystanders on warning signs. We only presented to a sample of teachers and did not measure the direct relationship to reporting of threats and how this moved from a Professional Discussion to a Level 1 Threat Assessment. For students, ideally, we would have wanted a larger audience sample, perhaps two middle schools and two high schools, to conduct a presentation. Although there was outreach, responses were limited and we had to scale down the scope considerably to one video production class creating a PSA on warning signs for their fellow students. For parents, educating them about warning signs and threat assessment did not occur in this grant directly. Dr. Holifield did present at two school district school boards about B-HARP and some parents in the community did have questions. Several school districts did discuss their threat assessment process and discuss warning signs with parents, yet this was during or following an investigation of the parents' students making the threats. So how do we best educate parents, educators, mental health professionals and the community about threat assessment principles and include them in the referral and monitoring process?

With the limited data in this area to guide us, through our experiential learning from the grant, the best way to initially educate teachers would be through either an in-person workshop at the beginning of the school year, during a teacher in-service day, or at a monthly teacher meeting after school. For teachers who had attended a couple of trainings, districts could move to online refresher trainings by which a certificate of completion would be provided. For parents, providing information for them on the district's website about BTAM and the basic district process would helpful. Districts should also provide information about warning signs and their threat assessment and management process in Annual Notifications and have parents sign that they have received that information. Including a brief presentation on threat assessment at Back to School Night for district schools by the Level 2 district represented would also provide another approach to parent education.

Finally, for students, districts do train student on how to use the various anonymous reporting apps for concerning behaviors with Text-A-Tip and Safe-2-Tell. What we learned from the B-SAVE Student Video Project is that the students in the classroom knew how to use the Apps but did not necessarily know "what" concerning behaviors to be aware of. Several non-profit organizations such as the Sandy Hook Promise offer student trainings on warning signs and school programs for school violence prevention. This would be an area of focus for future grants to examine the links of Bystander/Upstander education and how this links with school response to threats.

Interagency Collaboration:
To create a coordinated and collaborative system to assess and intervene as necessary with school-based threats, a system requires a structure and model as a guide. The Salem-Keizer/Cascade Preventative Behavioral Threat Assessment System was that model. Constructed in the late 1990s as a community grass roots approach in response to school shootings in Oregon, each community's resources are embedded within the Level 2 System to support school systems and the community in assessing and managing potential threats of targeted violence. This provides a focal point for "Silo Integration" and information sharing. The LA START program and the Glenn County SMART program also respond to higher level threats in schools and in the community, yet these programs are housed in only in the Mental Health Silo. The Salem Keizer/Cascade Model, which, by design, resides in the Education Silo, provided the best structure to test interagency collaboration on more concerning threat assessment cases through the Level 2 process, but within the Mental Health Silo.

Prior to selecting the Salem-Keizer/Cascade Model as a training and community system to test, we had started a process by establishing an ongoing body of professionals from all three silos and scheduled with monthly meetings to discuss the best way to achieve the grant goals. The Community Partner Meeting continued and by adding the Level 2 Threat Consultation Meetings, a tiered-approach developed where the Community Partner's attendees consisted of higher-level administrators within the Silos and the Level 2 members were mostly professionals who were deputies, officers, lead school psychologists, principals, mental health therapists, and special education coordinators. The Partner Meetings allowed for us to look at the collaboration and coordination of B-HARP activities at the administrative level with administrators sending their staff to trainings or MOU input. The Level 2 Meeting purpose and structure allowed for us to examine "Silo Collaboration and Coordination" in terms of threat assessment case consultation and management.

In reviewing the outcomes, the original goal was a thirty percent (30%) increase of interagency collaboration through the development and use of the coordinated and collaborative training system and model for threat assessment was far exceeded at the end of the grant. At the end of the grant, of the 25 community experts trained, 15 experts remained on the Level 2 Threat Consultation Team. As individuals left positions, new individuals arrived and this appears to be the natural flow. The goal for the future would be to have between 10-15 regular participants who attend Level 2 Meetings.

What were the outcomes when the Salem-Keizer/Cascade Model and B-HARP in decreasing the number of apparent or potential threats identified through referral? The original proposal discussed a 10% decrease in apparent or potential threats, but this was probably not the best metric language to use initially, especially since a model was not specified until 2020. Instead of tabulating a decrease in threats, a better approach was done to measure the percentage of threats responded to that were deemed of concern due to identified multiple risk factors such as suicidal/homicidal ideation, fixation on violent themes, research of dark topics, weapons access, etc. These issues would raise a higher level of concern and require more supports in response in a referral to the Level 2 Threat Consultation Team. These more concerning cases constituted 15% of threats initially discussed by the school team. From another perspective, for those threats responded to by the participating school districts, 85% of the cases were identified as not having enough factors to raise additional concerns about a credible threat. The cases that yielded more concern (15% of threats discussed at the

Professional Discussion) was a solid test of utilizing increasing focus and attention in gathering collateral information through the Level 1 and Level 2 Threat Assessments.

Tracking threats by those being made, to those threats discussed by school professionals, to completing a Level 1 Threat Assessment is important. This data shows that not all threats made required a threat assessment. Half of Professional Discussion by school team members led to a Level 1 Threat Assessment being conducted. This leads to how do we avoid stigmatization and criminalization of individuals, families, and community members who have participated in the threat assessment process when the threat was not found to be credible? All trainings held (Level 1, Level 2, Teacher, Mental Health Provider, Adult) talked about examining threat assessment through an equity lens. The Level 1 Protocol has an Equity Lens to address several types of bias and a handout was provided in discussing these potential biases.

For the Professional Discussions and Level 1 Cases, we were not able to obtain data from the school districts regarding special education eligibility, 504 eligibility, demographic variables, or whether the students arrested. We also could not capture calculable information about what happened after a Level 1 Assessment. Where rumors spread by students over social media about mental health status? Did teachers or parents react in a way that stigmatized students? There was no indication stigmatization indicated among the student cases at the Professional Discussion or Level 1 phases of the threat assessment process in discussions with school cases.

For the 2022-23 Level 2 Case Data and law enforcement and mental health involvement, in examining the Level 2 Case Data, of the 12 cases, 7 had some type of law enforcement involvement related to home wellness check, weapons check, weapon removal from home, weapons voluntarily surrendered, and a restraining order. One case involved Child Protective Services. In relation to mental health support, 6 students were already receiving mental health therapy and 5 offered therapy. One family refused support. Four cases involved MHET which resulted in a 5585 hold and three of those students were determined to be both suicidal and homicidal. With the increased involvement of risk factors and concerning behaviors, there were a few instances at some school sites where parents and teacher were worried and afraid about students being at school by which there were staff and parent meetings to listen to the issues presented.

Mental Health Involvement and Capacity Building
The original benchmark in 2019-202 was to show a 10% increase of the number of mental health professionals available to provide therapy as defined by the threat assessment team or report recommendations. With the training not really gaining traction until Spring of 2022 and districts adopting the Level 1 Protocol the following school year, there was not much time to gather data in this area. What was also not known or considered was the actual number of available and community therapists as a baseline in the community to compare at the beginning and end of the grant. What we do know is that in a training of 44 mental health professionals, 15 participants indicated a willingness to be a part of a clinician network to provide support to youth and families. Some of these professionals were in schools, while others were practicing in the community. One therapist from this training used her new knowledge acquired at the training to disclose information that led to a threat assessment being conducted at the school and a well-check visit at home.

What we were not able to answer or tabulate was how mental health providers should approach and treat individuals who have made threats or gestures towards homicidal violence. The answer may lie in the training data in terms of confidence levels, knowledge of threat assessment and management principles, and opinions about action in terms of disclosure and case management. Mental health providers did change their opinions about collaborative approaches with school threat assessment teams and their client's family. They also noted that a basic knowledge of threat assessment and management concepts would be useful in their therapeutic work with clients who were aggressive and potentially violent. How the therapists would apply this

information and what that therapeutic work may be is a question that will need to be answered in an ensuing grant.

SECTION 7:

FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR COMMUNITY

AND

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS

Future Directions for San Luis Obispo County and Other Communities

By setting and prioritizing the goals that we did, we were able to learn how a comprehensive community threat assessment system in terms of structure, process, and training can evolve over time stemming from a single idea within the community. The community engagement outcome data speaks volumes of how a few professionals can plant the seeds of a threat assessment model and process that eventually takes root with the proper attention, dedication, and persistence. Below the following lessons learned in this project that hopefully will guide the next community that wants to initiate a BTAM program in its community:

1) ***Identify the current interagency/inter-district relationships that exist in relation to safe schools, violence prevention, and community mental health crisis response.***
What are the current district and community processes that exist in responding to school threats and dangerousness towards others? What seems to be working in the community in terms of structure and process and what are the current needs?

2) ***Identify the individual professionals and leaders who have a shared interest in school and community violence prevention and threat assessment.***
Identify the key people who have legitimate decision-making power within their Silos and organizations. Moreover, which key decision makers are where likely to cross the boundaries of a district or agency (Silo) to enable knowledge exchange, translate language, and share values among various Silos. Form a workgroup and planning group to tackle issues related to reporting of threats, assessment of threats, and safety management. Plan and design a community safety conference to involving all Silos. Invite legal counsel from each of the Silos and develop a planning session to design and organize a community structure and detailed procedures about how information can be received, shared, stored, and accessed in relation among the Silos. Write an MOU to reflect this structure and process with appropriate examples, appendices, or exhibits.

3) ***Establish key people from agencies and districts with strong interest in threat assessment and train them in both basic and advanced BTAM principles (Level 2 Team).***
Identify those willing to become a cohort of community experts who would establish a Level 2 School Threat Consultation Team. Train them in all aspects of the Salem-Keizer/Cascade Model. Send them to additional threat assessment trainings on various advanced topics.

4) ***Build out the community mental health crisis system to include threat assessment and management for those who receive a 5585 for meeting the criteria as a danger to others. Link this system to the Level 2 School Threat Consultation Process.*** Identify private clinicians and community mental health organizations who take private pay and insurance who may would be willing to work with high-risk clientele and receive additional training in basic BTAM principles (MHP Training).

5) ***Increase community awareness of Warning Behaviors and BTAM processes through local Public Services Announcements, Informational Presentations at School and Community Meetings and Events.***
From Lesson 2 above, all the Silos should come up with a shared message for the community in terms of informing the community about the established structure and process related to BTAM. This will ensure better understanding among parents, parent advocacy groups, and the community at-large.

A Revised Community Model

The key systems question in the original proposal centered on identifying the best components that make an efficient, coordinated, and collaborative system and model related to threat assessment for MHP, LE and EL staff. The Salem-Keizer/Cascade (SKC) K-12 Preventative BTAM (See Appendix 1) with its structure, training, and forms provides a strong foundational structure for a coordinated and collaborative community system. It was a grassroots response to address a regional problem in the Willamette Valley in Oregon in the late 1990s.

The unique aspect of the SKC model is the Level 2 community component, which is readily adaptable to the needs of any locality or region by leveraging the region's available resources to support and promote approach to community safety in terms of targeted violence. The Level 2 component and the SKC process have been discussed throughout this document. What the B-HARP project has identified through its outcomes are structural components and processes which are prescribed within the SKC K-12 Model, but not necessarily expanded in terms of the other Silos, especially the MH Silo. The Mental Health Silo, from a community standpoint, has been increasing its collaboration, in general, with the Law Enforcement Silo in relation to CIT and mental health mobile crisis response. In turn Educational Institutions are rely on both LE and MH Silos for crisis responses for those students requiring inpatient hospitalization. In the SKC Model, the Level 2 School Threat Investigative Team is housed and supported in the Educational Silo with select community Level 2 team members from each Silo participating either in the assessment or as part of the consultation team.

Since the focus of Level 2 is to have the Silos share information and become less "walled" in procedures that would limit sharing of information, staff, and resources, our proposed model has been aptly labeled *Silo Integrated Network Model of Behavioral Threat Assessment and Managemen*t (See Appendix 10). In looking at Appendix 10, there are five Silos Identified, Education Silo (yellow), Law Enforcement Silo (blue), Mental Health Silo (salmon), a Community Silo (light green), and Level 2 Threat Consultation Team. Three of the Silos have bureaucratic structure and procedures about identifying, receiving, assessing, and responding to information about threats. These are the Level 1 Structures. In the SKC Model, the Education Silo has a highly specified Level 1 Protocol and Procedure. There are forms for the LE Silo and MH Silo Level 1 Team members to complete, yet the larger structure resides within the Educational Silo.

The Community Silo has very little structure in that it is the "informational environment" by which the other Silos operate. The Community Silo can have physical information (papers, verbalizations, gestures, etc.) that is heard or observable to persons within the other three Silos or it can be digital. The Community Silo is very fluid and information can go to all to of the three Silos simultaneously or it can go in parts to one or two of the Silos. Bystanders (Upstanders) reporting of warning signs is the conduit to providing information to the Level 1. Digital threats received by district third party reporting Apps are also part of this Silo. The Level 1 Education and Law Enforcement Silos are responsible for having their teams attend Level 1 training the and maintaining the Level 1 Protocol, Forms, and Procedures. In California, this is in order to meet the requirements of SB 906 School Safety: Homicide Threats.

The Mental Health Silo operates within the informational guidelines of the professional ethical and legae standards regarding receiving and sharing information about patients and clients. The mental health professionals could reside in county agency programs, non-profit agencies, for-profit businesses, and independent private practice. However, each community has a structure and procedure in response to mental health crisis response. Typically, it is a county agency that provides this service, but it can be other entities previously mentioned. What B-HARP found is that mental health professionals see the need to be involved in threat assessment and management whether as reporters of threats or therapists willing to support students/youth who have received a threat assessment. The Mental Health Silo is the appropriate Silo to expand its threat assessment and management capabilities in the community to supplement the initial triage work of a Mental Health Emergency Team MHET). The Mental Health Silo is also the appropriate Silo to engage in threat management and safety planning and information sharing to other Silos (as appropriate). This is especially true when a youth deemed a danger to others and placed on a 72-hour hold, returns to the community and is back at home. The Mental Health Silo along with the Law Enforcement Silo can also collaborate and initiate Level 1 Threat Assessments in the community in the evenings, on weekends, and in the Summer, when the Educational Silo may not be fully operational.

The Level 2 Threat Consultation Team is the "Hub Silo" of the *Silo Integrated Network Model*. Given its "integrated" role for information and Silo, a better name would be the Level 2 Integrated Support Silo. It

encompasses the community's standards in school and community violence prevention by creating MOUs that specifically defining and integrating the community structure, process, procedures for threat assessment and management. This Silo has two tiers, the Stakeholder Tier and the Operational Tier. The Stakeholder Tier involves the key community decision-makers from Law Enforcement (Sheriff, Probation, Police Chiefs, etc.), Educational Silo (Superintendents, Teacher Union Presidents), Mental Health Silo (Directors, CEOs, etc.), and Community Silo (Elected Officials, PTA Groups, Elected Student Body Presidents) and legal counsel representing the 3 Main Silos.

The role of Stakeholder Tier is to develop the structure and process which would be reflected in final MOUs, contracts, or other agreements. It is also the role of this tier to secure and maintain funding for threat assessment training, warning signs training, BTAM materials, and staff positions at both the Level 1 and Level 2 levels. This Stakeholder Tier would be responsible for "community messaging" in relation to prevention and educating the Community Silo. This representative body would meet quarterly to discuss the various issues that the community is encountering.

The Operational Tier's role is that of community experts in BTAM. The Level 2 Members in the Operational Tier can train Level 1 Teams within their respective Silos. The team members could provide Warning Sign Trainings to the Community Silo. The primary role would be to attend weekly or bi-weekly Level 2 Consultation Meetings and assist the Level 1 Teams and if the community creates the process, conduct more detailed threat investigations for complex Level 1 Threat Referrals. The Operational Tier would be responsible for maintain a database for cases consulted, document recommendations, and schedule case follow-ups/updates with Level 1 Teams.

Like the Salem-Keizer/Cascade Model, The *Silo Integrated Network Model of Behavioral Threat Assessment and Managemen*t would be a model that could be adjusted to each community's needs and resources. The difference with the proposed model is that it expands the focus and role on the Mental Health Silo and the Level 2 Integrated Support Silo and lends more specified role and structure for stakeholders and BTAM community experts. By dividing the Level 2 Silo into two tiers one that is administrative and one operational, it forces local leaders to take more responsibility and ownership in the community by creating a representative body the meets to discuss ongoing community structure, process, and funding in order to the sustain the model overtime. For the Mental Health Silo, it must identify and create a process the takes a deeper dive into the initial mental health crisis response, especially when it involves threats to others. The specific goals for this deeper dive would require involvement of the Mental Health Silo's community network of county programs, agencies, crisis response teams, crisis stabilization units, inpatient units, and independent private practitioners, A workgroup or task force specific within this network would develop The Mental Health Silo in terms of expanded threat assessment capabilities by creating a *Level 1-MH* protocol that would integrate the areas of suicide and violence risk assessment methods, but add to this protocol the detailed information gathering methodologies that threat assessment requires. By developing the structural components with the network, this process would inform further mental health case management and treatment leading to an informed safety plan and tailored treatment plan. In having the Level 2 structural and process components in place with MOUs agreed upon, for complex cases, this would lead to better safety monitoring among Silos as well as a Multi-Silo approach to treatment response.

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APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1:
B-HARP COMMUNITY SYSTEM PROCESS[1]

1. The Figure Above was adapted with permission by John Van Dreal and is based upon the Salem-Keizer/Cascade Preventative Behavioral Threat Assessment and Management Model

APPENDIX 2:
LEVEL 1 TRAINING PERCENT INCREASE

Percent Increase for Level 1 Trainings

Training	Date	Pre-% Correct	Post-% Correct	% Increase
Baseline	Sept 2020	70.51	81.94	**16.21**
Baseline	Oct 2021 General	54.17	68.52	**26.50**
Baseline	Oct 2021 Refresher	74.07	81.48	**10.00**
Baseline	April 2022 General	71.26	74.44	**4.46**
Follow-Up	Aug 2022 Protocol Training	67.20	78.74	**17.17**
Baseline	Feb 2023 General	66.84	77.04	**15.26**
				Average: 14.93

APPENDIX 3:
Level 1 Training Participants and Threat Assessment Background

Years of Threat Assessment Experience

Years of TA Experience	# of Participants
0	18
1 to 5	43
6 to 10	18
11+	32

Previous Threat Assessment Training or Workshops Attended

Number of Threat Assessment Trainings	Participants Reporting Previous Trainings
0	40
1 to 3	52
4 to 6	10
7+	8

Participants: Number of Estimated Threat Assessments Conducted

Number of Estimated Threat Assessment Conducted by Participants in Their Career	Participants Reporting Having Completed in the Career
0	22
1 to 5	35
6 to 10	17
11 to 15	7
16 to 20	12
21 to 50	13
51 to 75	3
75 to 100	1

APPENDIX 4:
2021 Level 2 Case Review Clinical Expert Score Sheet

PART 1 – TEAM REVIEW & INPUT Investigation	PART 2 – CASE PRESENTATION & DISCUSSIONS AT MEETING Threat Assessment and Management
Group 1 Case Organizer (4 points)	Discussion: What is the threat potential level? (1 point)
__ Psychological Risk Factors	_____ *Threat Posturing, Preparatory Behaviors,*
__Sociological Risk Factors	_____ *Rehearsal Fantasies*
__School/Organizational Risk factors	_____ Level (see below)
__Stability Factors	Insignificant---Low---Moderate---High---Critical
__**NO INDICATORS PRESENT IN CASE**	___**NO INDICATORS PRESENT IN CASE**
__**GROUP DID NOT ACCURATELY IDENTIFY**	___**GROUP DID NOT ACCURATELY IDENTIFY**
Group 2 Case Organizer (4 points)	Discussion: Are there identified threatscapes? (2 points)
Pathway of Targeted Violence:	___Any indicators of possible/probable triggers?
Grievances-Violent Ideations-Research & Planning, Pre-attack Preparation, Probing & Breaches, Attack	___Any significant life events?
__ Pathway adequately identified	___Any indicators of possible 'guardrails' and stabilizing resources?
__**NO INDICATORS PRESENT IN CASE**	___**NO INDICATORS PRESENT IN CASE**
__**GROUP DID NOT ACCURATELY IDENTIFY**	___**GROUP DID NOT ACCURATELY IDENTIFY**
Predatory Pathway:	Discussion: What are threat management considerations? (3 points)
__Interest	___Mitigation of threat and/or re-emerging threats
__Fixation	___Containment of all parties involved
__Planning	___Management of subject & threatscape
__**NO INDICATORS PRESENT IN CASE**	___**NO INDICATORS PRESENT IN CASE**
__ **GROUP DID NOT ACCURATELY IDENTIFY**	___**GROUP DID NOT ACCURATELY IDENTIFY**
Group 3 Case Organizer (4 points)	**CASE REVIEW SCORE:**
Aggressor Continuum:	Part 1, Group 1:_____/4 or **0 if no indicator**
__Affective<------------>Predatory	Part 1, Group 2: _____/1 __ /3 or **0 if no indicators**
___**NO INDICATORS PRESENT IN CASE**	Part 1, Group 3:_____/1 __/3 or **0 if no indicators**
___**GROUP DID NOT ACCURATELY IDENTIFY**	Part 2, All Groups: _____/6
	TOTAL: _____/18
Cadence of Aggression:	Comments:
Intensity, Frequency, Duration	_____
___Cadence adequately identified	_____
___Escalated, plateaued or de-escalated	_____
___Enduring pattern present/Severe & pervasive	
__**NO INDICATORS PRESENT IN CASE**	
__**GROUP DID NOT ACCURATELY IDENTIFY**	

APPENDIX 5:
LEVEL 2 CONFIDENTIALITY STATEMENT

B-HARP STAT does not case manage. The B-HARP STAT (School Threat Assessment Team) is a consultation team that assesses violence and assists case managers with threat management and the identification of resources.

B-HARP STAT
(B-HARP STUDENT THREAT ASSESSMENT TEAM)

B-HARP STAT CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT

The following rules apply while staffing threats and concerns of violence through the
B-HARP (School Threat Assessment Team) STAT process:

1. The confidentiality policies of your agency apply.

2. You are responsible for any material (hard copy, documents, reports, etc.) that you present and its dissemination and retrieval after presentation.

3. You are responsible for the confidentiality (see #1) of any documents collected through staffing.

4. If you intend to take any action as part your agency's role, that action must be shared with B-HARP STAT at the staffing.

5. As circumstances change, cases may be restaffed by B-HARP STAT at the request of case managers.

_____   _____   _____
   Sign Name   Title/Agency/District   Date

_____
PRINT Name

APPENDIX 6:
LEVEL 2 MEETING SAMPLE AGENDA TEMPLATE

B-HARP LEVEL 2 THREAT ADVISORY TEAM MEETING

I. **Introductions, Agenda Review, Confidentiality Statement-**Read at Beginning
Action Items Update from a Threat Advisory Workgroup

II. **CASE UPDATE**
Up to 15 minutes: Level 2 District Representatives (School administrator / counselor, agency case worker, and/or police officer) reviews any changes of concerns of previous presented cases, the implementation of supervision plan and intervention, and outcomes of current supervision and intervention.

Up to 20 minutes: B-HARP Investigative Team reports on new information gathered through further investigation, any evaluation or assessment completed, or the development of resources, interventions and community supervision changes.

Any School Debriefing Report to Be Shared (Redacted Information)?

III. **LEVEL 2 ASSESSMENT-IF NECESSARY**
Up to 30 minutes: Level 1 District Case manager (School administrator / counselor, agency case worker, and/or police officer) reviews threat or incident, concerns, current supervision and intervention, and outcomes.

--District Cases that did not lead to Level 1-Professional Discussion
--Level 1 Threat Assessment Findings and Plan (Non-Level 2)-
--Level 2 Threat Advisory Committee Referrals for Review

Up to 15 minutes: B-HARP Level 2 Team presents results of any assessment.

Up to 20 minutes: B-HARP Level 2 Team discusses conducts further assessment, consults on supervision strategies and explores community resources.

IV. NEXT STEPS?

LEVEL 2 STUDENT THREAT CONSULTATION TEAM TO ASSESS
 ___Yes ___No

LEVEL 1 TEAM AND DISTRICT PROVIDED WITH SUPORT or MANGAGEMENT OPTIONS FROM THREAT ADVISORY TEAM?
_____Yes ____None Required at this time

IF Yes, PLEASE LIST OPTIONS for Level 1 Team Below:
1.
2.
3.

Appendix 7:
Original Partner Meeting Agenda Example

B-HARP Partners Meeting
December 10, 2020

Attendees: Dr. Joe Holifield, John Van Dreal. Adam Helfand, Amber Gallagher, Chris Dowler, Jason Hooson, Jill Rietjens, Lauren Lederer, David Groom, Owen Lemm

I.   **Agenda Overview and Introductions**
II. **Welcome and Updates**
   a. Training Updates
      i. Present data from trainings (Dr. Holifield and Owen Lemm)
         1. Data from pre-post shows improvements in scores for both trainings
         2. Varying levels of expertise present
         3. Advanced only had 2 Law Enforcement
III. **Moving Forward**
   a. Level 1 and B-HARP Team (Level 2) Organization and Implementation (Dr. Holifield)
IV. **Community Design and Issues to Consider**
   a. B-HARP Identity and Role in Community (John Van Dreal)
V.   **Identity and Community Role** (Dr H)
   a. TA advisory vs TA investigation
   b. Mind Map Network of Services (Dr. H and Owen)
   c. MOUs, Review of Drafts (Dr. Holifield)
   d. Refining level 1 to your own district
   e. Level 2 team meeting next week, meeting twice a week
   f. Dr. H is drafting a 6-month plan
VI. **Next Steps**
   a. John: Oversight committee (fidelity with model) will drill down deeper
   b. TA sheet is template of questions, subtract out what you don't want from the prewritten responses
   c. Can use template or fillable form
   d. Level 2 program complementary to MHET team

APPENDIX 8:
STUDENT VIDEO RUBRIC

TV Video B	Name:	Trimester ___3___ WEEKS from ___9___ to ___12___	
Production Rubric	Section:	PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENT	TITLE:

Client Learning Objectives:		Deficient: 1 - 2 points	Acceptable: 3 - 4 points	Exemplary: 5 points
+NTAC Information +Reasons why students ignore threats +Reasons why students may not report a threat +When to report and what to report +Whom to report to +How to report, and how to use the following tools - Admin, Teacher, Text-A-Tip, School Resource Officer	**CONTENT & PURPOSE** 1 2 3 4 5	The message is unclear. The message leaves no impression on the viewer and is inappropriate for the intended audience. The purpose of the PSA is not clear.	The message is clear. The message leaves little impression on the viewer and some aspects are inappropriate for the intended audience. The purpose of the PSA is clear after initial clarification.	Message is clear and creative. The message leaves a lasting impression on the viewer. The message is clearly targeted to impact the intended audience. The Clients Learning Objectives are met throughout the story
	CREATIVITY & EXECUTION 1 2 3 4 5	Images, special effects, slogan and sounds communicate basic or cliche/already used ideas w/o a fresh perspective. Production elements seem quickly assembled.	Images, effects, slogans and sounds communicate a general creativity. The PSA incorporates a few original ideas. Slogan or message is not quite as sharp as it could be.	Images, special effects, slogan and sounds communicate creative ideas and execution. The PSA incorporates innovative and original ideas.
	SHOT COMPOSITION 1 2 3 4 5	• Little attention was paid to proper composition • Shot variety is inadequate; almost no lights • Almost all of the shots were handheld and shaky • Shot sequences were missing • Subject lighting is inadequate	• Composition demonstrates basic competence • Shot variety is adequate; too few tight shots • A tripod was not used for many of the shots • Shot sequences are used at times • Subjects are adequately lit when necessary	• Shots demonstrate careful composition • Quality shot variety (long, med., many tights) • Unique angles enhance shots • Tripod use for smooth shots evident • Sequences are common throughout story • Subjects lit well throughout all shots
	SOUND DESIGN 1 2 3 4 5	• Soundbites, stand-ups, VOs are unclear • Camera mic used instead of external mic • Natural sound is not used • Music and/or sound effects are inappropriate and detract from the story focus	• Soundbites, stand-ups, VOs are mostly clear • Natural sound is used minimally in the story • If used, music and/or sound effects are appropriate and enhance the story focus	• Soundbites, stand-ups, VOs are all clear • Natural sound is used effectively in the story • If used, music and/or sound effects are appropriate and enhance the story focus
	EDITING 1 2 3 4 5	• Shots and script rarely synchronize • The story's details are not ordered logically • Story lacks full screen graphics that would have helped convey important information • Levels are unequal, distracting throughout • Script is not always audible or understandable	• Most shots synchronize with script • Story orders details logically • FSGs (if used) are basic but relevant • Sound levels are basically equal, undistracting • Script is easy to hear and understand	• Shots relate thematically to script • Story is organized clearly and is engaging to the audience• High quality full screen graphics are used (if needed) to convey important information • Levels are perfectly equalized throughout • Script is concise; sound bites are set up well
TOTAL POINTS:				

APPENDIX 9:
EXAMPLE OF LIKERT SCALE MEASURMENT TOOL

23. **If my adolescent client showed concerning behaviors at school that warranted a threat assessment, I would collaborate with the school team and my client's family to identify and develop a safety management strategy.** ⊙ 0

| Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
○	○	○	○	○

24. **Community and school-based mental health professionals have an important role in understanding and identifying concerning behaviors by clients who may be on a pathway towards violence.** ⊙ 0

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
○	○	○	○	○

25. **I believe a basic knowledge of threat assessment and management concepts would be useful in my therapeutic work with clients who are aggressive and potentially violent.** ⊙ 0

Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Undecided	Agree	Strongly Agree
○	○	○	○	○

APPENDIX 10: SILO INTEGRATED NETWORK MODEL OF BEHAVIORAL THREAT ASSESMENT AND MANAGEMENT*

*Appendix 10 both model name and associated figure are copyright of Holifield Psychological Services, Inc. and Joseph E. Holifield, Ph.D. All rights reserved.